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Summary
Many years ago, Dutch economist and Nobel laureate, Jan Tinbergen introduced the so-
called gravity model of international trade. With this model he brought the Newtonian law
of universal gravitation to the international trade theory, stipulating that trade between
two countries is proportional to the product of the countries economic size (in gross
domestic product) and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Today, the
gravity model is considered as one of the most successful empirical models in modern trade
theory and has been devoted an extensive attention by researchers ever since Tinbergen.
The purpose of this master thesis is to discuss how the gravity model of international trade
can be used to estimate the effects of economic integration agreements (EIAs) on member
countries’ trade flows. This is discussed with reference to Eurasian regional integration
between three post-Soviet countries of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan - the Eurasian
Economic Union. I review what is the core definition of regional integration and have an
in-depth look at the history of Eurasian region, what have been the prerequisites for this
integration and what are the economic characteristics of member countries.
I study the theory of gravity model, both its theoretical and econometrical methodology,
although limiting my discussions to what is relevant for my own estimations. In this re-
spect I investigate the theoretical application of the model given by Anderson & Wincoop
(2003) and then further discuss the different empirical approaches, especially emphasising
the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood approach by Silva & Tenreyro (2006). With
this I try to eliminate two out of three most common empirical issues in gravity literature
- heteroskedasticity in error terms and omission bias (the third being reverse causality).
In order to study the effect the Eurasian Economic Union potentially has on its member
countries’ trade flows I construct an independent dataset. I use data on country specific
characteristics (such as real export flows, real GDP, cultural and historical ties) and eco-
nomic integration agreements (EIAs) and run my own regressions based on the discussion
of both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the gravity model. My results and data
confirm the general finding that being a member of an economic integration agreement
leads to an increase in a country’s international trade flows. My estimations show that
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union increases members’ trade flows by approxi-
mately 150%. This high coefficient value is supported by my combined dataset on export
flows between these member countries during years 2010-2013.
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1 Introduction
During the last few decades there has been large integration of world economy and several
viable integrations projects have been implemented so as to reduce or totally eliminate
different economic frictions between nations. As of 15 June 2014, the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) has received 585 notifications of regional trade agreements, and 379
of these are in force. Trade agreement is a wide treaty on tax, tariff and trade between
several countries, often of preferential and free types, established in order to reduce (or
eliminate) tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions on items traded between agreement’s
signatories.
The regional economic integration agreement in focus of my thesis is Eurasian Economic
Union. This is a newly upcoming economic integration project between post-Soviet coun-
tries Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The Union is fully implemented as of 1 January
2015, so in period of writing this thesis (except for first two weeks of January) the Eurasian
Economic Union does not exist in its final form, but there are two other projects that
have been realized for a while now - Customs Union (since 2010) and Single Economic
Space (since 2012) between given countries. This thesis sets out to discuss the relation-
ship between this economic integration agreement and member countries’ international
trade, a relationship best evaluated by use of so-called gravity model of trade. This model
has become both an empirical and theoretical success and is widely used by international
trade researchers as it accurately predicts trade flows between countries for many goods
and services over period of time. Gravity model’s comparative advantage is in its abil-
ity to use real data to assess the sensitivity of trade flows with respect to policy factors
researchers are interested in.
The Eurasian regional integration is still young and fragile, but very ambitious in its
perspectives and has been developing at high speed for the past four years. Consisting
of three countries that are perceived by many as authoritarian, built on "friendship" of
three highly authoritarian leaders, many researchers consider this project short-lived and
doomed to failure, while others see a clear potential, as long as specific trade and welfare
increasing measurements are taken. It is not my intend to evaluate whether or not this
Union will have positive or negative welfare or economic effects, I do not look at these
implications of it. Main point of my thesis is to use a well-defined model of international
trade and applying it with given dataset estimate and analyse what effects on bilateral
trade flows of member countries the above given two projects (Customs Union and Single
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Economic Space) have had, and from this speculate, given the trade theory, what effects
there are to be expected from a full-functioning Eurasian Economic Union.
There exists a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical literature on gravity
model, that has been focus of trade researchers ever since it was introduced by Jan Tin-
bergen in 1962. In short, the traditional gravity equation of international trade is a model,
which explains trade flows between exporter and importer GDP’s and trade frictions in
form of geographical distance between the countries. For long time gravity model lacked
a proper theoretical foundation, although it was considered as one of the most empiri-
cally successful in economic literature. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) accounted for
this theoretical issue by introducing price indices for importer and exporter countries as
multilateral resistance terms. These terms mean that trade frictions with all other trade
partners outside of the trade agreement also affect the signatories bilateral trade and hence
need to be included in the equation. The problem is that these terms are almost impossi-
ble to observe and hence there are a range of econometrical approaches that account for
this issue. Fixed effects estimation (suggested by e.g. Feenstra, 2004), first order Taylor
approximation of the multilateral resistance terms by Baier & Bergstrand (2009) are the
two most important ones. To account for issues of heteroskedasticity and zero observa-
tions in trade Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation has been introduced by
Silva & Tenreyro (2006) as a simple solution to this. All this makes clear that the gravity
model is an obvious choice in evaluating the effect of Eurasian regional integration on
trade flows and I review in-depth these different approaches, whilst regarding only those
relevant for my thesis.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 specifies economic integration agree-
ments and looks closely at the Eurasian regional integration, the history of the region,
reviewing in short what are the prerequisites for such integration. Chapter 3 introduces
the gravity model. Here I summarise the literature on gravity equation and the studies
dealing with the problems of theoretical and empirical characteristics. I review the model
in its basic and theoretical forms, then further study the empirical methodology of the
theoretical model. In chapter 4 I apply the theoretical model and discuss the results of
my own estimations. I use a comprehensive dataset consistent of different characteristics
and exports flows of 45 different countries over four years. I look at how different trade
agreements, and especially that of Eurasian Economic Union, affect the bilateral exports
flows for members of these agreements. Chapter 5 summarised and concludes my thesis.
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2 Economic Integration Agreements
2.1 Defining regional integration
Regionalism has long become a dominant factor in the development of world trade. As
a result of this, during the last decades there has been a large growth in the number of
international economic integration agreements. In general, economic integration agree-
ments (EIAs) are treaties between nations that aim to reduce policy controlled barriers to
the flow of goods, capital, labour and services between countries. Most of EIAs tend to be
regional trade agreements (RTAs) and most tend to be free (or preferential) trade agree-
ments (FTAs). Today there exists few successful trade agreements or economic unions,
European Union would be the sole winner, having been able to establish a common mon-
etary union, harmonise legislations, developed policies ensuring free movement of people,
goods, services and capital, and maintaining common policies on trade and regional de-
velopment. European Union has become a manual for other attempts of similar regional
economic integration.
Economic integration between countries can take on different forms depending on the
objectives and goals of the member states. The World Trade Organization (WTO) dis-
tinguishes between 3 types of regional economic integration1:
1. Customs Union , which under GATT Article XXIV, paragraph 8a, reads as: ”A
customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs
territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to sub-
stantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and (ii) subject to
the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations of
commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories
not included in the union”;
2. Free trade area , which under the same GATT article, paragraph 8b, reads as ”a
group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories”;
1http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_09_e.htm
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3. Economic Integration Agreement .
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines2 a regional
trading agreement as an agreement among governments to liberalize trade and possibly
to coordinate other trade related activities. There is distinction between four principal
types of regional trading agreements:
1. Free trade area: a grouping of countries within which tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers between the members are generally abolished but with no common trade
policy (the so-called common external tariff, CET) toward non-members. The North
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) are examples of free trade areas.
2. Customs Union: an arrangement among countries in which the parties do two things:
(i) agree to allow free trade on products within the customs union, and (ii) agree to
a common external tariff (CET) with respect to imports from the rest of the world.
3. Common Market : a customs union with provisions to liberalize movement of re-
gional production factors (labor and capital).
4. Economic Union: a common market with provisions for the harmonization of certain
economic policies, particularly macroeconomic and regulatory. The European Union
is an example of an economic union.
It is obvious from these definitions that a classification of a regional integration agreement
assumes several degrees of depth, all dependent on what the goals, aims and wishes
are of the involved partners. It also implies that certain elements of liberalization of a
common economic space are added to the previous level of integration, and in this way the
integration project evolves. These elements can be summarised in four following points:
1. elimination of tariffs and large number of non-tariff barriers between member coun-
tries (areas of free-trade or sectoral free trade);
2. establishment of a common external tariff (CET) with respect to imports from rest
of the world;
2http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3130
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3. policy harmonization with regards to competition, fiscal, monetary, structural and
social politics;
4. unification of economic politics and creation of supranational bodies (economic and
political union).
The main focus of my thesis, the Eurasian Economic Union, is an integration project that
the three founding member states - Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus - have been working
on it for several years now, taking all the necessary steps given above, and at this point in
time are in the final process of unification of their economic policies and establishment of
fully functional economic union. There are many uncertainties regarding this project and
it is not my intend to give a well-defined answer to whether or not this Union will succeed
or fail. Given the economic and econometrics tools at hand, my intend is to analyse what
kind of effect Customs Union and the Single Economic Space of the Eurasian regional
integration has so far had on trade flows of member countries and if there are any positive
outcomes to be expected, in pure trade terms. I wish to emphasise that my estimations
and discussions are limited to what is available and that there has yet not been, to my
best knowledge, a proper empirical evaluation of Eurasian regional integration and hence
I do not have any other studies to compare my results to. Nonetheless I believe that,
given the history of the region, the existing theory of international trade and the data at
hand, the estimated effects are to be assumed to yield a realistic picture of the current
development, although I am, of course, fairly cautious in my interpretation of the results.
In the following subsections I introduce the idea behind Eurasian regional integrations
- the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) - what it is and what is the history behind it.
I review recent discussions by scholars who analyse the project both in economic and
political terms, and try to set it in a perspective of international theory of trade creation
and trade diversion.
2.2 Eurasian regional integration
On October 3rd 2011, then the prime minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, wrote an article
for the Russian newspaper Izvestia 3, ambitiously titled ”New integration project for
Eurasia, a future born today”, in which he supported and embraced an idea of a
3http://izvestia.ru/news/502761
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new geopolitical project on the post-Soviet space, called Eurasian Economic Union, that
would unify economies of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. And so it goes.
”A major integration project kicks off on January 1st 2012, the Single Eco-
nomic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. A project that, without
any exaggeration, is a historic landmark not only for our three countries, but
also for all countries on the post-Soviet space. On July 1st 2011 controls over
movements of goods were lifted at the internal borders of our three countries,
thereby completing the formation of a full-fledged single customs territory with
clear prospects for implementing the most ambitious business initiatives. Now
we are taking steps from the Customs Union towards a Single Economic Space.
Creating a huge market with more than 165 million consumers, with unified
legislation, free movement of capital, labor and services. At the time it took
40 years for Europeans to go from the European Coal and Steel Community
to the full-fledged European Union. The creation of the Customs Union and
of the Single Economic Space is much more dynamic, since it takes into ac-
count previous experience of the EU and other regional associations. We see
their strengths and weaknesses. And in this is our obvious advantage that al-
lows us to avoid errors and to prevent reproduction of all sorts of bureaucratic
canopies. ”
2.2.1 History
In 1991 the Soviet era was put to an end after the Belavezha Agreement 4 was signed by
three of the four republics-signatories of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), and it was announced that the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) would be established in its place. This was the first attempt to reintegrate
the post-Soviet republics on a new, fresh basis. Several, non-viable integration initiatives
were formed on the space of the collapsed Soviet Union. But the idea to try to keep what
is good from the Soviet Union in the CIS and to get rid of all that is bad without really
revising the grounds of the association and reflecting over the new geopolitical realities
was originally stillborn. The formality and the futility of the CIS was repeatedly stated
by it´s members, but attempts to breathe life into it were in general useless. Then, the
previous Soviet republics began to try to find a more pragmatic alliance, which resulted
4http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/History/Pages/Item.aspx?itemid=749
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in a series of new regional integration initiatives.
Historically5 the attempts to unify the post-Soviet region have been as follows:
• In 1995 leaders of Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and later Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan signed the first agreement on the establishment of Customs Union,
which on 29 March 1996 was transformed into Eurasian Economic Community
(EurAsEC). It was established for an effective promotion of the process of for-
mation of Customs Union and of Single Economic Space. The Eurasian Economic
Community was officially signed on 10 October 2000 and it came into force on 30
May 2001. In December 2003 the EurAsEC was granted observer status at the UN
General Assembly.
• In August 2006, at the EurAsEC Interstate Council, a principal decision was made
to establish a Customs Union between only three countries - Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Russia.
• On 6 October 2007 in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan, leaders of Kazakhstan, Be-
larus and Russia signed a treaty on the establishment of a single customs territory
and the concept of the Customs Union. Action plan for the formation of the Cus-
toms Union was designed for three years. It was also decided to form Customs Union
Commission - a supranational body. Russia got 57% of the votes in the Commission,
while Kazakhstan and Belarus - 21.5% each.
• In 2009 the Customs Union Commission came into force. Several documents were
signed that formed the legal basis of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan
and the Russian Federation, including the Treaty on Customs Code of the Customs
Union, agreement on Community’s Court, which was vested with an authority to
resolve legal disputes within the Customs Union. A plan of action for the forma-
tion of the Single Economic Space between Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian
Federation was approved.
• On 28th November 2009 a meeting was held in Minsk between presidents Dmitry
Medvedev (Russia), Alexander Lukashenko (Belarus) and Nursultan Nazarbayev
(Kazakhstan) regarding establishment of a common customs area on the territory
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan from 1 January 2010.
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EurasianEconomicCommunity
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• In June 2010 Belarus confirmed that the Customs Union will be launched in the
trilateral format with Customs Code of the Customs Union entering into force.
• On July 1st 2010 the Customs Code became applicable at the territory of Russia
and Kazakhstan. On July 6th 2010 the Customs Code came into force on the entire
territory of the Customs Union.
• In December 2010, at the summit of the Eurasian Economic Community in Moscow,
an agreement was reached on establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union on the
basis of the Common Economic Space of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. A single
market for the Eurasian Customs Union came into effect in January 2012, the Single
Economic Space. The Single Economic Space implies removal of most trade barriers
with some common policies on product regulation, freedom of movement of factors
of production (such as capital and labor), and also of enterprise and services.
• In October 2011 the Free Trade Agreement within CIS was signed by Russia, Be-
larus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan, and
ratified by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Armenia in 2012. The CIS free trade
agreement is not the same as the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and
Belarus, these are two different integration projects, and three countries in focus of
my thesis are members in both of them.
• On 10 October 2014 state leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan signed the documents on the Abolishion of the Eurasian Economic Com-
munity (EurAsEC). This association ceases to operate in connection with the start
of operation of the Eurasian Economic Union from January 1, 2015.
• On 10 October 2014 Armenia officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian
"Trio" after the addition of Armenia became a "Quartet".
From here on I refer to Eurasian Economic Union as Eurasian regional integration, con-
sistent of Customs Union established in 2010 and of Single Economic Space, established
in 2012. In the following subsection I give a brief introduction of the three countries and
then look at why exactly this regional integration project has probability of succeeding,
at least seen in reference to all other previous attempts.
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2.2.2 Countries Economic Characteristics
Only two years prior to joining WTO in 2012, Russia formed the Eurasian Customs Union
with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Even though all these three countries have their past in
the Soviet era and to this day remain authoritarian regimes, they still have different
economic models (see figure 1 for overview of countries key economic indicators). Russia
is a classical example of state capitalism, with big monopolies and state controlled large oil
sector, growing fat on raw material exports. The economy of Belarus is weak and largely
dependent on Russia, on its loans and non-repayable subsidies. The country survives on
exports of mid-level engineering products to the Russian market. Figure 2 shows that
38.14% of Belarus’ exports in 2012 was of mineral products, such as refined and crude
petroleum, and also petroleum gas. The country also imports just as much, and even
more - 40.57% of total Belarus imports in 2012 are of mineral products (see figure 3).
This is according to Observatory of Economic Complexity6, which also states Russia as
Belarus’ top import origin and export destination. Kazakhstan’s economy is one of the
strongest and fastest growing in Central Asia and has experienced steady growth since
the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Much as Russia, Kazakhstan has based its economy on
exports of raw materials, the country is second after Russia in the region in oil exports.
Figure 1: Economic indicators for Eurasian Economic Union
Russia Belarus Kazakhstan
Population in millions 143, 5 9, 46 17, 04
GDP in billion current US$ 2096, 77 71, 71 224, 41
GDP per capita in current US$ 14 612 7 575 13 172
Exports in million US$ 82 510 37 203 527 265
In PPP terms, Russia accounts for 86% of the Eurasian regional bloc’s GDP and 84% of its
population. Kazakhstan is second in line, with 8% of GDP and 10% of population, while
Belarus and country’s economy and population both amount to approximately 5% of the
total. According to World Bank’s country overview7, during 2001-2008, Belarus’ GDP
grew annually by 8,3 %, which was larger growth than that in Europe and Central Asia
6http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/blr/
7http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/belarus/overview
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Figure 2: Products exported by Belarus in 2012 (in %)
Figure 3: Products imported by Belarus in 2012 (in %)
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Figure 4: Products exported by Kazakhstan in 2012 (in %)
and any other country in the Commonwealth of Independent States. This was largely due
to strong export demand by CIS partner countries and underpriced energy imports from
Russia. This growth slowed down substantially under world financial crisis of 2008-2009
and the country has since then gone through a recurring macroeconomic instability.
The economy of Kazakhstan is of special interest. Kazakhstan plays a particular role,
and not only in the Central Asian region, but also with regards to the Eurasian regional
integration. The country has experienced an economic boost and its GDP has been
growing by an average of 5 % for the past couple of years. Much of Kazakhstan’s export
is highly dependent on shipments of oil and other related products (71.36% of total exports
in 2012, see figure 4). Country’s main export partners are China and Russia. See also
figure 5 for overview of Kazakhstan’s total imports as given by Observatory of Economic
Complexity for 2012.
Recently the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed8 future prospects
of the country and what challenges lie ahead. Considering the cyclical downturn in the
8http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_218341_poslanieprezidentarespublikikazakhstannnazarbaeva-
narodukazakhstana11noyabrya2014g
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Figure 5: Products imported by Kazakhstan in 2012 (in %)
global economy, current drop in the oil prices, which is the chief exports of Kazakhstan,
deteriorated relationship between Russia and the West and the economic sanctions against
Russia - he has proposed and put forward several viable projects for 2015 that will help
to boost the economy even further, so that the country remains on its path to becom-
ing one of the 30 most economically developed countries, which is the goal. Kazakhstan
has almost same GDP per capita as Russia, as well as low unemployment, a balanced
budget, little foreign debt and significant foreign currency reserves. Kazakhstan is the
main attraction for foreign direct investment, now more than ever, since the political cri-
sis between Western countries and Russia has intensified. Foreign investors are looking
for a more stable and prosperous, both politically and economically, place to invest their
money in, and Kazakhstan has been able to supply such conditions. For the past years the
country has attracted more foreign direct investment per capita than any other country in
the Commonwealth of Independent States. Kazakhstan’s dynamic development intensifies
the growing competition between the country and its closest partners in EEU - Russia
and Belarus. This growing economy in the Central Asia might not be a complimentary
asset for Russia, but rather a competitive counterpart in the long run. Unlike Russia,
Kazakhstan does not have any geopolitical ambitions and does not spend enormous re-
12
sources on this cause. Instead the country is actively attracting foreign investments in
all economic sectors, developing its agricultural sector, has its economic base on exports
of raw material and is developing its large potential as a transit center. Kazakhstan is
also drastically improving its national infrastructure now and in the following years. This
includes everything from modern highways, ports and ferry services, power lines and a
transport hub on the border with China. From before Kazakhstan and China, world’s
largest importer of oil, have developed the first direct oil pipeline9 running from Caspian
shore to Xinjiang in China, with a current capacity of 14 million tons per year. Also, with
facilitation from Russia, Kazakhstan is working on its accession to WTO.
Taking account of all these facts, it is a common agreement that Kazakhstan has potential
to become driving force of the Central Asian countries. This is in reference to four other
Central Asian countries in the former Soviet bloc (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan), and their potential for integration within Eurasian Economic Union. These
countries have a rather low degree of intra-industry and intra-regional trade, as argued
by Libman (2008). Even though these countries are landlocked, there has still been
low integration because of significant trade barriers, such as high tariffs and frequent
changes in them, explicit exports taxes or highly implicit taxes levied on the imported
goods but not on the same goods produced domestically. But, as Libman points out,
because of Kazakhstan’s recent economic success, the country can become a driving force
in creating the necessary conditions for development of regional multinationals and help
the neighbouring countries to attract foreign direct investments, as well act as a center of
attraction for labor migration.
2.2.3 Common External Tariff
In its current form, the Customs Union provides a common external tariff within its mem-
ber states and the removal of their internal customs posts. The common external tariff
means that same customs duties, import quotas, preferences or other non-tariff barriers
to trade apply to all goods entering the customs union area, regardless of which country
within the area they are entering. This way the tariff affects the trade with all non-
customs union partners. The common external imports tariff within EEU, adoption of
which was the first practical measure to affect the trade of member countries, was able to
harmonise more than 85% of tariffs from the outset. In addition to adopting a common
9http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan?China_oil_pipeline
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external tariff, internal border controls between countries were removed. Interestingly,
controls were stepped up on the border with direct neighbours in the CIS, which have
opted to stay out of the Union (Dreyer & Popescu 2014). As argued by Tarr (2012), the
CET is in essence a reflection of the import duties adopted by Russia and because of
that big changes have taken place in Kazakhstan, which had to introduce a substantial
increase of import tariffs when the country joined the Customs Union. Prior to introduc-
ing the common external tariff there already existed a significant level of tariff schedules
convergence between Belarus and Russia, and as a result of this Belarus had to increase
only 7% of its 11 200 tariff lines, while 18% decreased. On contrary, Kazakhstan increased
10% of its tariff lines, while whole 45% had to be decreased. According to World Bank
report (2012) on costs and benefits of the Customs Union for Kazakhstan, the estimated
result of implementation of common external tariff increased Kazakhstan’s tariffs from
an average of 6.7% to 11,1% on an unweighted basis, and from 5.3% to 9.5% on trade-
weighted basis. This tariff change made those imports, to which the changes applies,
less competitive in comparison with similar goods produced within Customs Union mar-
ket. In his initial estimation of the Customs Union, De Souza (2011) lists a figure over
changes in tariff lines for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia (see below) and from it it’s
clear that Kazakhstan had highest percent of changes. Increases were seen on means of
transportation, pharmaceuticals, wood, electro-mechanical domestic appliances, footwear,
etc (De Souza 2011).
In Russia, 14% of the tariffs increased and 4% decreased. For Russia, the Customs Union
represent an expansion of the market - before the CET many of Russian manufacturing
firms were not competitive in Kazakhstan because of low tariffs in Kazakhstan. But these
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firms were able to expand their sales to Kazakhstan market once the common external
tariff was implemented and Kazakhstan had to increase its tariff on many items. The
World Bank (2012) evaluated changes in tariff of the Customs Union as a loss of real
income for Kazakhstan, as country’s imports were displaced from Europe and under the
umbrella of CET most of imports were shifted to Russia, which again represented a
substantial transfer of income from Kazakhstan to Russia.
Russia, on the contrary, has less to lose in pure trade terms. The country’s largest trading
partner is the European Union and since it’s imports from Customs Union partners are
marginal, the scope of potential trade diversion is less than for Kazakhstan and Belarus.
Furthermore, Russia has not had any substantial change in its external tariffs. According
to Tarr (2012) the country has benefited by expanding its exports, even if they are not
competitive, while Kazakhstan and Belarus were deprived from importing higher quality
goods from Europe because of the tariff.
2.2.4 Theory of economic integration applied to Eurasian Economic Union
As Eurasian Economic Union is not yet in force, I discuss the patterns of the project as
of a Customs Union, without considering the details of the union, such as free flow of
labour or capital, or the unification of the economic politics. These specifications are not
important for my estimations and hence I omit the discussion of them. What is important
is the understanding of theory of economic integration and what the underlying factors
and outcomes are. In this section I briefly elaborate on that.
The last 10-20 years are characterized by an extraordinary surge of interest in regional
integration. Regionalism has become a dominant factor in the development of world trade,
it affects both the economic and political relations between the countries involved, forcing
them to decide whether or not to enter trading blocs, which form of integration to prefer,
etc. Modern approaches to the study of regional integration are based on the construction
of models that assess changes in commodity prices, the trade volume and structure of
production in different sectors, gains and losses of the producers, consumers and the state
as a result of the mutual elimination of customs duties and general administration of
customs barriers.
Formation of the theory of economic integration is associated with works by Viner (1950)
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"The Customs Union Issue" and Lipsey (1957) "The Theory of Customs Union: Trade
Diversion and Welfare", who assessed the impact of entry into regional trade agreements
(RTAs) in terms of static effects of trade creation and trade diversion, showing whether
or not countries welfare increases or decreases as a result of agreement on customs union
that eliminates tariffs in mutual trade. The importance lies in understanding whether
the increase in trade attributable to the customs union is due to the emergence of new
trade flows, which becomes possible because of liberalization of trade within the customs
union (trade creation), or due to redirection of existing trade flows from countries outside
of the customs union towards customs union countries (trade diversion). Trade barriers
removal increases the gains from trade if imports from partner country replace less efficient
(with higher costs) domestic suppliers, which result in trade creation effect. In contrast,
trade diversion occurs when lower cost imports from outside of customs union (free trade
zone) are displaced due to the distorting influence of tariff rates on production of partner
countries.
In later research regarding the effects of trade agreements on countries net welfare, in-
creasing emphasis was placed on geographic proximity as a criterion for membership in a
preferential trade agreement. Regionalism in preferential trade has been argued by some
as being key to generating better economic outcomes. Krugman (1991) proposed an idea
that if the countries of the regional trading bloc are the so-called "natural partners",
they are most likely to benefit from participation in this agreement and the gains will be
greater the higher the share of intra-regional trade. In another paper, "Is Bilateralism
Bad?", Krugman (1989) expressed worries regarding the trade liberalization and increases
of trade blocs and discussed the possibility that countries, that join trading blocs, are more
protectionist toward countries outside the blocs than they were before, so that the world
trade is actually hurt by such integration in the long run. This is probably best seen with
reference to external tariff on imports that members in a bloc have to agree on - if it is
given, then there are higher possibilities that it might actually be harmful to the members,
while members can benefit if the common external tariff is adjusted optimally. But this
is not always the case; in example of Customs Union the external tariff is largely given by
Russia with member countries forced to adjust their tariff to it, with subsequent losses.
This way a customs union will choose policies that in fact lead to trade diversion. The
theory says that the usual increase in relative prices of goods imported from other, non
customs union countries, due to higher common external tariff, lead to opposing effects
on income. There is real income increase because imports cost relatively less on the world
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market, so that the purchase of consumption goods is higher. However, the increase in
the domestic relative price of imports reduces consumption and real income because the
domestic relative price of imports exceeds the world price. The final effect is the sum of
these two, and it can be either positive or negative. In the context of his model, Krug-
man reflects around the issue of whether or not bilateralism is actually bad or not and
concludes that it depends on transportation costs and behavior of the blocs and how they
set their tariff policies. He emphasises that it would be rather naive to think that any
movement towards freer trade in terms of different trade agreements would exclusively
be a positive thing, and that the picture as whole is much more complicated than that.
This is true in reference with any other trade theory that different liberalizing projects
can be both trade creating or trade diverting, thus having different effects on welfare and
economy as such.
Michalopoulos & Tarr (1997) discuss in their paper "The Economics of Customs Union
in the Commonwealth of Independent States" the partial equilibrium models and how
they can be used to consider the static effects of participation in the Customs Union by
countries of Commonwealth of Independent States. Their distinction between customs
union effects regard static effects and dynamic effects. The static effects, as pointed out,
relates to custom union’s impact on welfare of participating countries. The dynamic effects
focuses on the impact the customs union has on the growth output rate of a country. They
draw attention to the fact that output growth can not be equated to welfare growth, as
some of the mechanisms that may result in growth of output in the future may at the
same time be forces reducing consumption and welfare in the present. They argue on
the case of CIS countries joining the Customs Union after the fall of Soviet Union and
conclude that the dynamic effects of the customs union are likely to be negative because it
will most probably lock countries in the old technology of the Soviet Union. They propose
a partial equilibrium model to evaluate the consequences of joining a customs union and
adopting a common external tariff, where the CET is higher than the initial tariff. In
their paper they exemplify it by saying that adaptation of CET leading to higher import
tariffs would be the case for smaller economies, such as Kyrgyz Republic or Armenia, but
in the existing Eurasian regional integration today it is the case of Kazakhstan, that had
to increase its tariff rate in order to unify under common external tariff. Their conclusion
is that a tariff will induce inefficiency losses, and that preferential trade arrangements
with small partner countries are inefficient. In later studies, once the Customs Union
and the common external tariff between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan were in place,
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Tarr (2012) sees the parallel to the earlier Customs Union from 1996 that failed due to
imposition of large costs on Central Asian countries, who had to buy either lower quality
or higher priced Russian manufactured goods under the tariff umbrella. Russian tariff is
yet again the point of departure for the present Customs Union but still it has a potential
to succeed. According to Tarr, due to Russia’s accession to the WTO in 2012, the tariff of
the Customs Union will fall by 40-50 percent. This, together with Customs Union’s aim
to reduce non-tariff barriers and more deeper integration (i.e. service liberalization, free
flow of capital and labour and some regulatory harmonization), has a greater potential
for a successful economic union between post-Soviet countries.
There are still justifiable concerns that the institutional development of these countries
are not progressed far enough to take full advantage of greater integration. As it is
reported by Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom the various CIS countries
have varying levels of trade freedom that is liberalizing only slowly, if at all. Heavy country
interventions means that trade is still directed, rather than liberalized, thus distorting
both its composition and its direction. Hartwell (2013) argues that the proposed moves
toward increased integration can raise welfare of member states if they fulfil the "second-
best" alternative and allow for greater policy and institutional liberalization. The theory
of second best was formalized by Lipsey & Lancaster (1956) in "The General Theory of
Second Best", when they showed that if one Pareto optimality condition in an economic
model cannot be satisfied, then all other Pareto conditions are no longer desirable and an
optimum situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Pareto conditions.
The optimum situation then attained is to be perceived as second best, because it is
achieved subject to a constraint, which prevents the attainment of a Pareto optimum.
When applied to international trade theory the theorem indicated that trade policies
introduced in a customs union can improve national welfare in the way that they act to
correct the imperfections or distortions. This increase in national welfare is larger that
the loss in welfare arising from the application of the policy.
But theory is not always applicable. Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom10
gives a pretty fair overview of different economic freedoms in all three countries within
Eurasian regional integration, ranging from investment and trade freedoms, to corruption
and business freedoms. When it comes to trade freedom the level of it has been below the
world average for both Belarus and Russia in 2009, while for Kazakhstan it was above
the average. During the following years this level increased for Russia and Belarus and
10http://www.heritage.org/index/visualize
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today all three countries are approximately on the same level of trade freedom, with
Belarus scoring higher than the initial trade liberalization by Kazakhstan, a score of
81,4. This ideological bias towards controlled trade has its roots in the development
of the financial sectors of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. A lack of liberalization of
financial systems pervades the region. Also, according to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing
Business rankings11, no country in the CIS is even in the top 100 in terms of "ease of
trading across borders" 12. This clearly points out the large existence of non-tariff barriers
between the member countries. From a political standpoint many trade and integration
barriers remain in place because there are vested in interests in keeping these barriers,
and unilateral liberalization is practically impossible. This distorts production and trade,
creating rent-seeking opportunities.
Most of the independent researches conducted regarding the prospects of the Eurasian
regional integration conclude with the notion that this kind of greater integration has
a potential to work and be successful for all parties only if it is based on fostering the
trade liberalization that has been missing from the region. Acting as the European Union
did back in the post-war era, the Eurasian Union could help member countries take the
liberalizing steps they could not take on their own.
Accession of Kazakhstan and Belarus to WTO, elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade
between member countries and closer cooperation between EU and EEU could be some of
the driving forces for success of Eurasian Economic Union. A cooperation with EU could
help EEU to bring about the benefits that the EU has conferred on Europe, including cre-
ating political stability, internal economic liberalization and continued engagement with
its periphery (Hartwell 2013). The European Union is associated with modernization and
rule-based governance, and in this way a closer cooperation between these two regional
unions can promote Russia to adopt similar approach for its regional policy and the other
members of EEU will follow. Even though the current diplomatic crisis because of situa-
tion in Ukraine makes the environment somewhat aggressive, looking purely objectively
at the economic aspects there is a solid foundation for some sort of economic cooperation
between EU and countries of EEU. The territorial proximity, large investment potentials,
even larger trade flows coupled with transfer of technologies are some of the factors as to
why an economic integration would be a good idea for both parts.
11http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ
12http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders
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3 The Gravity Model of International Trade
In this chapter I introduce and discuss the gravity model of international trade, which is
commonly used to measure effects of economic integration agreements (EIAs) on trade
flows. I start by reviewing brief history of gravity in trade and it is not my intend
to present a deep understanding of the model, as it is large and complex. I present a
selected survey where I focus on what is most relevant for my thesis, the tools needed to
discuss the effects of economic integrations agreements on trade flows. In later chapters I
apply these tools to my estimation of effects of Eurasian regional integration on bilateral
trade flows of the given countries in my data.
First, I introduce the basic version of the gravity model which is fundamental for under-
standing the modern concept of gravity equation in trade. Then I present a theoretical
gravity equation as proposed by Anderson & Wincoop (2003) which has been ground-
breaking in theory of international trade, with its strength and limitations. Here I also
review in short alternative specifications of the theoretical gravity model. Following the
theoretical approach I discuss the most common estimation methods used in the gravity
literature. The discussions are limited to what is relevant for my estimation in chapter 4.
3.1 Brief history of gravity in trade
In recent decades there has been a continued globalization of economic processes, and there
is continuously growing volume of international trade. Creation of General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), then later World Trade Organisation (WTO), various forms
of preferential trade agreements, establishment of international institutions to facilitate
and promote trade in one way or another reduce the total costs of production of the
world´s output and increase the diversity of commodities. A global production model
becomes all the more familiar, in which various intermediate components are produced in
different countries on different continents, while many large manufacturing firms have long
become transnational. Over the past twenty years world trade has significantly changed
the locations of production facilities. Virtually all countries, with only few exceptions,
are intensively involved in international trade. The recent economic crisis of 2008-2009
showed that such model of global economy, even if it implies greater diversification of
trade relations, still led to transfer of risk via a commodity chain to basically all world
economies once the problems were detected with key economic players. In situations like
these, in order to hold on to a sustainable economic policy, it is crucial to understand the
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mechanisms and limitations of international trade, and also factors that affect the volume
and routing (selection of specific delivery schemes) of trade flows. One of the most popular
econometric models, which can be obtained from many of the classical trade theories that
attempt to identify the given factors, is the gravity model of international trade. I don’t
think there has been a single article on application of gravity equation that has not used
term ”empirical workhorse” when explaining the equation´s ability to study expost effects
of different trade agreements on bilateral trade flows.
Nobel laureate Tinbergen (1962) was the one to introduce the gravity model when he, in
1962, published an econometric study using the gravity equation for international trade
flows. He brought the Newtonian law of universal gravitation into the theory, stipulat-
ing that trade between two countries is proportional to the product of the countries size
(in gross domestic product) and inversely proportional to the distance between them.
Loosely speaking this means that the bilateral trade increases as the economic size of
countries increases, and decreases as the distance between the trading countries increases.
As the author noted himself, the application of the model is quite simple, as it connects
the volume of export from one country to another, Xij, with the following explanatory
variables: GDP of the exporting country Yi (or just a function of the exporting country´s
characteristics), GDP of the importing country Yj (function of importing country´s char-
acteristics), geographical distance between these two countries, Φij, and a log-normally
distributed error term ij:
Xij = YiYjΦijij (3.1.1)
Tinbergen did not use any theoretical predictions and applied the econometric model
specifications right away. He explained the choice of the above given explanatory variables
by following intuitive considerations:
1. the volume of export of goods that a country can provide for international exchange
depends on the size of the country´s economy (i.e. GDP);
2. the quantity of goods that can be sold in any country depends on the size of the
country´s market (i.e. GDP);
3. the trade volume should depend on goods transportation costs, which, by author´s
assumptions, should be proportional to the distance between countries considered.
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In addition, Tinbergen added dummy variables in his regression (variables that take on
values 1 or 0) for estimation of participation of partner countries in various trade agree-
ments, such as British Commonwealth or the BENELUX Free Trade Agreement, and also
a dummy for whether or not two countries share a common land border. The author
used simple multiplicative expression that associate the above given factors with export
volumes from one country to another. Equation (3.1.1.) can be modelled in a linear form
by taking its logs and adding the dummies:
lnXij = lnβ0+β1lnYi+β2lnYj+β3lnΦij+β4ADJij+β5EIA1ij+β6EIA2ij+lnij (3.1.2)
where lnβ0 is a constant term, and ADJij is dummy variable for common land border,
while EIA1ij and EIA2ij are dummies for various trade agreements.
An empirical estimation of this equation with respect to 42 countries showed that main
variable coefficients are significant and had correct sign, consistent with intuitive predic-
tions of the model. These results lay ground for further widespread use and replication
of this form of the gravity equation. At the same time, the work of Tinbergen did not
provide a strict and comprehensive theoretical basis of this specification of the trade equa-
tion. The traditional approach of linearizing and estimating the gravity equation using
OLS techniques was not efficient enough.
The model is mostly used in relation to examination of bilateral trade patterns in search
of evidence on regional trading blocs, the estimation of trade creation and trade diversion
effects from regional integration (Frankel & Romer (1999), Brada & Mendez (1985)); the
estimation of trade potential, for instance with application to trade between the European
Union and its potential members (Baldwin (1994), Hamilton & Winters (1992)). The
model was widely used and applied in 1990s when numerous authors employed it to
assess the potential benefits of trade between the European Union and newly (due to fall
of Soviet Union) transforming economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
3.1.1 Limitations of the basic gravity equation
The traditional gravity equation gained large acceptance among trade economists and
international policymakers for at least three reasons:
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1. Formal theoretical economic foundations surfaced for a specification similar to the
traditional gravity equation. In his article "A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity
Equation" Anderson (1979) showed that a simple general equilibrium model with
products differentiated by country of origin and constant elasticity of substitution
preferences yields a basic gravity equation; "Market Structure and Foreign Trade" by
Helpman & Krugman (1985) introduced assumptions of monopolistic competition
and increasing returns to scale, thus explaining intra-industry trade with gravity
equation between countries with similar factor endowments and labor productivities;
"The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some Microeconomic Foundations
and Empirical Evidence" by Bergstrand (1985) introduced proxies for multilateral
price terms for importers and exporters, showing empirically their importance in
explaining bilateral trade flows between countries;
2. Consistently strong explanatory variable (high R2 values);
3. Policy relevance for analyzing the multitude of free trade agreements over the past
15 years.
But, the traditional theoretical gravity model specification has in later years come under
scrutiny and large criticism. The reasons are many:
• The traditional specification ignores the fact that the "remoteness" of regions i and
j from the rest-of-the-world’s (ROW ′s) regions should influence the volume of trade
from i to j, and the economic size of the ROW ′s regions matters as well. This is
intuitive: suppose countries i and k enter into a preferential trade agreement that
lowers tariffs of their respective goods. Basic economic theory will suggest that this
will most probably have an effect on trade flows of country j, even though it is not
part of the agreement. Trade creations and trade diversions are examples of such
effects. However, the traditional gravity model does not account for this effect at
all. This is at odds with standard trade theory and is a classical case of omitted
variable bias.
• Applications of the traditional gravity equations to study the bilateral trade costs
often yielded seemingly implausible findings. This can be seen from McCallum´s
result of "border puzzle" ("National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade
Patterns" McCallum (1995)), when the estimates of the effects of national borders
on intra-continental (world) and inter-regional trade flows are often implausibly
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high. On the example of United States and Canada border, McCallum showed
that inter-province trade in Canada is 22 (2200%) times larger than the country’s
trade with the US states, all else equal, a result called home bias effect in trade
theory. This result indicates that the presence of formal and informal trade barriers
following national borders is the reason as to why inter-regional trade increases
and home bias exists. Anderson & Wincoop (2003) apply their theoretical gravity
model to resolve this border puzzle, and conclude that McCallum’s large border
parameter for Canada happened due to a combination of the relative small size of
the Canadian economy (which was not taken into account) and omitted variable bias
(multilateral resistance terms are not included in the estimation). Once controlled
for these two factors, Anderson and van Wincoop conclude that the national borders
reduce trade between the US and Canada by about 44%, thus solving the border
puzzle. Anderson and van Wincoop paper was framed as a resolution to the puzzle
McCallum had exposed.
The introduction of multilateral resistance to trade by Anderson and van Wincoop and
the subsequent inclusion of heterogeneous productivity on the supply side showed how
the gravity model had capacity to go from being an empirical relation to a model with
full theoretical foundation, applicable in the modern theory of international trade. In
the next section I go into detailed microfoundations of the basic model and of the An-
derson and van Wincoop model. I focus on limitations of the model and look briefly at
alternative specifications, considered on the demand side and the supply side. Further I
focus my attention on econometric estimation of the theoretical gravity model and look
at alternative to Anderson and van Wincoop methods.
3.2 Microfoundations
3.2.1 The general definition
The general version of the gravity equation implies that now all characteristics of ex-
porter/importer are included in the definition variables, in contrast to model by Tin-
bergen, where characteristics were specified to gross domestic product (GDP) of both
exporter and importer. I follow the basic form of the gravity equation by Head & Mayer
(2014), given as:
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Xij = GSiMjφijij (3.2.1)
Here Xij is the same variable of bilateral export from country i to country j, as before.
Si represents all ”capabilities” of the exporter i, Mj captures all characteristics of the
importer market j, φij represents bilateral accessibility of exporter i to importer j and
combines all concepts of frictions in trade (all from natural trade costs, such as geograph-
ical distance, to politically motivated trade costs, such as borders, tariffs and NTBs).
Lastly, G is a gravitational constant, which is allowed to vary over time if the above
equation was estimated using panel data analysis.
The most important feature of this equation, as argued by Head & Mayer (2014), is
that this way of defining the gravity equation requires that third-country effects must
come through the multilateral terms Si and Mj. By imposing a small set of additional
conditions, Head and Mayer express the exporter and importer terms in equation (3.2.1),
Si and Mj as functions of observables:
Xij =
Yi
Ωi
Xj
Φj
φijij (3.2.2)
where Si = YiΩi and Mj =
Xj
Φj
. Equation (3.2.2) is called the structural gravity equation.
Country i′s value of production, Yi = ΣjXij is defined as the sum of its exports to all
regions, and the value of country j′s expenditure, Xj = ΣiXij, is defined as the sum of its
imports across all exporters. The terms Ωi and Φj are the multilateral resistance terms
defined as:
Φj =
∑
l
φjlYl
Ωl
and Ωl =
∑
l
φljXl
Φl
(3.2.3)
What is important with these two multilateral resistance terms is that they include all
trade frictions between all trading partners for both i and j, i.e. partners l. The friction
between j and its other trading partners, all l 6= i, will affect its demand for goods from
i.
This basic form for the gravity equation relates bilateral exports multiplicatively to the ex-
porter´s value of production, importer´s value of expenditure, the bilateral trade frictions
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and controls for multilateral resistance. The fact that each term enters multiplicatively
does not necessarily reflect any features of economic theory, and is rather rooted in the
model because of its historical analogy to the Newtonian law of gravity. However, beyond
this point of specification of the multilateral resistance terms, this type of gravity model is
difficult to use for estimation purposes, and hence a more elaborate theoretical framework
is needed. In the next section, I derive the general framework from Anderson & Wincoop
(2003), omitting some of the calculations (or rather leaving them for appendix), discuss
briefly limitations of their equation and some of the alternative approaches. Then I go
further into alternative estimation methods of the equation and its estimation given by
Feenstra (2004) (fixed effects OLS estimation), Baier & Bergstrand (2009) (first order
Taylor approximation of the multilateral resistance terms) and Silva & Tenreyro (2006)
(Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation).
3.3 Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model
Common to most of the theoretical papers on gravity equations before Anderson and van
Wincoop´s introduction of multilateral resistance to trade was the role of price levels.
Anderson & Wincoop (2003) refined the theoretical foundation of the gravity models to
properly account for the endogeneity of trade costs and the consideration of institutional
barriers to trade. Based on the theoretical model of trade they indicated that costs
of bilateral trade between two regions are affected by the average trade costs of each
region with the rest of its trading partners and provided evidence of border effects in
trade, using a Non-linear least squares estimation (NLS). In this they introduced notion
of multilateral resistance, which is the average barrier between two partners to trade with
others (Kepaptsoglou, Karlaftis & Tsamboulas 2010).
3.3.1 Deriving the theoretical gravity equation
One of the main underlying assumptions in the Anderson and van Wincoop model (A-vW
model) is that consumers have identical and homothetic preferences and hence their utility
exhibit Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution (CES). The second important
assumption of the A-vW model is that goods are differentiated by place of origin. This so-
called Armington assumption, after Armington (1969), implies that two goods of the same
type originated from different regions are imperfect substitutes. A related assumption is
that each country specializes in production of only one good and regards the supply of
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each good as fixed.
The CES utility function is stated as:
Uj =
[
N∑
i=1
β
(1−σ)/σ
i c
(σ−1)/σ
ij
]σ/(σ−1)
(3.3.1)
where cij is consumption of goods from i by consumers in j, σ is the elasticity of substi-
tution, βi is an arbitrary parameter of preference towards goods from country i and N is
the number of countries.
The consumers maximise their utility subject to the budget constraint:
N∑
i=1
pijcij = Yj (3.3.2)
where pij is the price on goods faced by importers in country j (exporter i´s supply
price) and Yj is the nominal income of the region j´s residents. Prices on the goods differ
between locations due to trade costs that are not directly observable and it has been
the main objective of the empirical work to identify exactly these costs. Trade costs are
modelled according to ”iceberg”-structure, where it is assumed that a fraction of costs tij
of the good is lost (i.e. it ”melts”, hence ”iceberg” definition). Taking this into account
the price of goods from i sold in j can be written as pij = piτij, where pi is the exporter´s
supply price and τij = 1 + tij are trade costs that incurs imports. The nominal value of
exports from i to j is then Xij = pijcij = τijpicij. Total income of region i is therefore
Yi =
∑
j Xij, that can also be thought of as a market clearing condition.
Maximazation of (3.3.1) subject to the budget constraint in (3.3.2) with respect to cij
yields following demand function (for full derivation see appendix A):
Xij =
(
βipiτij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj (3.3.3)
where Pj is the consumer price index of country j, given by:
Pj =
[∑
i
(βipiτij)
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(3.3.4)
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Anderson and van Wincoop apply the same technique in deriving their gravity equation
as one by Deardorff (1998), who followed Anderson (1979) in using equation for market
clearance to solve for the coefficients (βi), while imposing the choice of units such that
supply prices pi are equal to one and then substituting into the import demand equation.
The only difference from this approach that Anderson and van Wincoop take is that
this time they are interested in the general equilibrium determination of prices and in
comparative statistics where these will change, and hence they keep the price variable,
insert Xij from equation (3.3.3) into the market clearing condition Yi =
∑N
j=1Xij and
solve for (βipi)1−σ, yielding:
(βipi)
1−σ =
Yi∑N
j=1(
τij
Pj
)1−σYj
(3.3.5)
Now define world GDP as Y w =
∑N
j=1 Yj. Expanding the right hand side of equation
(3.3.5) by ( 1
Y w
)( 1
Y w
)−1 , and inserting the following from this expression back into the
demand equation in (3.3.3) yields:
Xij =
(
τij
Pj
)1−σ
YjYi
Yw
[
N∑
j=1
(
τij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj
Y w
]−1
(3.3.6)
Rearranging this equation yields the Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model:
Xij =
YjYi
Yw
(
τij
PiPj
)1−σ
(3.3.7)
where P 1−σi and P
1−σ
j are the multilateral resistance terms, defined as:
P 1−σi =
N∑
j=1
(
τij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj
Y w
(3.3.8)
P 1−σj =
N∑
j=1
(
τij
Pi
)1−σ
Yi
Y w
(3.3.9)
Multilateral resistance terms in their simplest definition means that if two countries are
surrounded by two larger economies, say Belgium and Netherlands bordered with France
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and Germany respectively, then they will trade less between themselves than if they were
surrounded by oceans (like Australia and New Zealand), or by vast stretches of deserts
and mountains (such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan). These terms capture the fact of
dependence on trade costs across all possible exports markets (for the exporters) and all
suppliers (for the importers). Furthermore, specific to their estimation, Anderson and van
Wincoop define the unobservable trade costs τij as a log linear function of observables -
bilateral distance between countries i and j, dij, and whether there is an international
border between i and j, a dummy variable bij:
τij = d
ρ
ije
bij (3.3.10)
3.3.2 Limitations of the Anderson and van Wincoop model
Anderson and van Wincoop developed a theoretical solution to the multilateral resistance
problem, that played a pivotal role of their impact on the theory of gravity equation, but
had trouble in their estimation of this theoretical approach. The multilateral resistance
terms Pi and Pj are not observable since they do not correspond to any price indices
collected by national statistical agencies. To be able to solve the model in terms of
observed data, Anderson and van Wincoop make additional assumptions. One of the
assumptions is that country j´s expenditure, Xj =
∑
iXij is equal to its nominal income
Yj, Xj = Yj. They also assume symmetric trade costs τij = τji, which in principal is a
very strong assumption, because most of bilateral trade costs are asymmetric. In their
theoretical approach the elasticity of substitution σ is also unobservable, so they end by
by assuming values of σ. Together these assumptions imply symmetric price indices,
Pi = Pj. As an estimation method Anderson and van Wincoop propose the nonlinear
least squares estimation (NLS).
One of the biggest problems with these assumptions and the underlying estimation method
is that the assumption of symmetric trade costs is very strong, and the nonlinear least
squares estimation method is very difficult, and time and data consuming. Hence there
has been a need for an alternative estimation method and another way of proxying for
multilateral resistance terms. A simpler alternative, often used, is to use a proxy for
multilateral resistance terms called "remoteness" variable Herrera & Baleix (2010) ("Are
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estimation techniques neutral to estimate gravity equations? An application to the impact
of EMU on third countries’ exports"):
Remi = Σj
distij
(GDPj/GDPROW )
(3.3.11)
where the numerator is the bilateral distance among two countries, i and j, and the
denominator is the share between each country´s GDP in the rest of the world´s (ROW )
GDP. Anderson and van Wincoop include this variable in their regression and compare
their previous results with estimation results with remoteness variable, and conclude that
this procedure is not theoretically correct, since the only trade barrier the variable captures
is distance. Which is not the only bilateral barrier to trade between countries.
If we go back to our structural gravity equation in (3.2.2), the assumptions by Anderson
and van Wincoop of balanced trade (Xi = Yi) and symmetric trade costs (φij = φji)
will yield Φi = Ωi. This will in turn imply Si = Mi in the general equation, leading
to a symmetric gravity equation. In the next subsection I go further into alternative
theoretical specifications of the gravity equation, albeit not detailed.
3.3.3 Alternative specifications of the gravity equation
The historical approach to proxy for multilateral resistance with remoteness terms ap-
peared too weak once the theoretical modelling of gravity became clearer, as predicted by
Anderson and van Wincoop. And since their own approach and estimation method appear
to meet criticism, several alternative methods have been proposed. Head & Mayer (2014)
go through a range of variants of gravity for trade that comply with the structural gravity
assumptions. Without going into detailed mathematical specifications, I review here in
short something that has been defined as the demand side specifications and the supply
side specifications of the theoretical gravity model. After that I go over to econometric
estimation of the gravity model in section (3.4).
Demand side specifications
As mentioned previously, the first economic foundation for the gravity model was based
on specifying the expenditure function to be a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
function (Anderson 1979). This is the same used in theoretical model’s specification by
Anderson & Wincoop (2003). Trade under monopolistic competition and the gravity
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equation are often linked with each other. The gravity equation arises naturally when-
ever countries are specialised in different goods. Such specialisation is sometimes called
the "national product differentiation" and this occurs under the monopolistic competi-
tion model. The standard symmetric Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman monopolistic competition
assumption states that each country has Ni firms supplying one unique variety each to the
world from a home country production site. The monopolistic competition implies increas-
ing returns to scale. Consumers follow the same CES utility structure as in the Anderson
and van Wincoop model with assumption of "love of variety" preferences. Bergstrand,
Egger & Larch (2013) use this alternative approach in their research. In their model
the "love of variety" assumption implies that the exogenous preference parameter β1−σ/σi
in the CES utility function (3.3.1) is now replaced by endogenous number of preferred
varieties (number of firms) by the consumer, ni. Assuming same prices and trade costs
as before, the utility maximisation is as follows:
Uj =
[
N∑
i=1
nic
(σ−1)/σ
ij
]σ/(σ−1)
(3.3.12)
subject to
Yj =
N∑
i=1
nipiτijcij (3.3.13)
Which yields following demand for each variety (I omit the derivation):
cij =
(pjτij)
−σ
P 1−σj
Yj (3.3.14)
On the production side, labor is the only resource and each firm requires the following
labor to produce output of yi:
li = α + ϕyi (3.3.15)
where α is the fixed labor input (cost) needed for production and ϕ is the marginal labor
input. Monopolistic competition has two key equilibrium conditions for the firms. First
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is that each firm maximises its own profits, which ensures that prices are a markup over
marginal costs:
pi =
σ
σ − 1ϕwi (3.3.16)
where wi is the wage rate in country i and ϕwi determines the marginal cost of production.
Second, there is free entry to firms whenever economic profits are positive, so the long-run
equilibrium must ensure zero profits, yielding that:
yi =
α
ϕ
(σ − 1) = y (3.3.17)
so that the output in each firm in each country is the same, yi = y. Then, to determine the
equilibrium number of products/firms they make use of the assumption of full employment
of labor in the economy, using equation (3.3.15):
nili ⇒ ni(α + ϕyi) = Li ⇒ ni = Li
ασ
(3.3.18)
Following Feenstra (2004), Bergstrand et al. (2013) establish that the value of aggregate
bilateral exports from country i to country j is given by Xij = nipiτijcij, where ni is the
number of firms (products) in country i, τij ≥ 1 are ad-valorem iceberg trade costs, and
cij is demand in j for output of each firm in i. Inserting the demand function (3.3.14),
the equilibrium price (3.3.16) and the equilibrium number of firms in (3.3.18) into this
aggregate exports function yields the alternative Bergstrand et al. (2013) gravity equation:
Xij = YiYj
(Yi/Li)
−στ 1−σij∑N
l=1 Yl(Yl/Ll)
−στ 1−σlj
ij (3.3.19)
where ij is the multiplicative error that the bilateral trade flows is measured with. Sub-
ject to the market clearing condition Yi =
∑
j Xij (which is the same as in Anderson
and van Wincoop), this represents an alternative structural gravity equation based on a
unconditional general equilibrium framework. Bergstrand et al. (2013) note three results
from this: that the system of equation (3.3.19) subject to the market clearing condition
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allows for asymmetric bilateral trade costs, which was not possible in the model by An-
derson and van Wincoop; that all endogenous variables in the model (such as Yi, Xij
and Yi/Li) have observable values for the initial conditions and that pi (proportional to
wi) is identified, which was not possible in the Anderson and van Wincoop model. They
establish three alternative methods to correctly estimate elasticity of substitution σ and
by applying their framework empirically to McCallum’s "border-puzzle" generate an un-
biased estimate of the elasticity of substitution and economic welfare comparative statics
that differ significantly from those provided by Anderson and van Wincoop’s technique.
Supply side specifications
Eaton & Kortum (2002) derive a mathematically equivalent structural gravity model that
is based on homogeneous goods on the demand side, iceberg trade costs and Ricardian
assumption of difference in technology with heterogeneous productivity for each country
and each good. This assumption of firm heterogeneity makes it possible to analyze how
trade costs affect the production structure. In equilibrium of this model the share of
goods demanded from country i to country j is determined only on the supply side and
the influence of elasticity of substitution σ disappears into a constant term. If some
frictions in bilateral trade increases marginal cost of production of a good, then trade will
be reduced through reduction of the production within each firm, i.e. via the extensive
margin. If it happens so that firm’s fixed costs are increased, then trade flow will decrease
due to the fact that fewer firms will be able to produce. This kind of model was used by
Egger & Larch (2011).
3.4 Estimating the Gravity Model - Methodology
After the debate on the theoretical specification of the gravity model found some peace
with the specification by Anderson and van Wincoop of the multilateral resistance terms
and subsequent alternative specifications, it then turned to the important issue of per-
formance of different estimation techniques. There are a number of ways to estimate a
gravity model, all dependent on which structural representation is determined and what
econometric issues are desirable to estimate. To this day there are three important issues
in estimation of the gravity model: how to control for unobservable theoretical multilat-
eral resistance terms econometrically, what to do with zero-observations in trade due to
log-linearization of the theoretical model and how to control for the endogeneity of free
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trade agreements. Problems concerning the validity of the log-linearization process of
the gravity model in the presence of heteroskedasticity of the error terms and the loss of
information due to the zero trade flows have been explored more specifically recently.
Zero observation of trade means that not all countries trade with each other, and those
observations with zero trade in the dataset will be eliminated, when the equation is log-
linearized, and so in this way we omit important information; and the endogeneity of
FTA’s means that free trade agreements are not a product of two countries deciding
upon it, but it is more a product of something that is naturally existent. As said earlier
regarding Anderson and van Wincoop gravity model, both use of non-linear least squares
in estimation and the assumption of symmetric trade costs have been criticised, when it
comes to their theoretical specification of the multilateral resistance terms. To account for
these issues I discuss here three sets of alternative techniques that have been applied in the
literature: fixed effects OLS estimation, Taylor series approximation of the multilateral
resistance terms by Baier & Bergstrand (2009) and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
estimation by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) as explained by Shepherd (2012) "The Gravity
Model of International Trade". But before I start with these I overview briefly the linear
method of ordinary least squares estimation.
I also dwell somewhat on the issue of reversed causality in the estimation. The theory is
that high income leads in general to more trade, but it is also apparent that more trade
leads to higher income. As gravity equation performs poorly in estimating the effects
of increase in trade flows on welfare, I rather look on the reverse causality in trading
partners-countries initiatives to establish free trade agreement between themselves. As
discussed in details by Baier & Bergstrand (2007) and Egger, Larch, Staub &Winkelmann
(2011) the free trade agreement variable is not an exogenous independent variable as was
assumed previously, but an endogenous one. The reverse causality is reflected in the idea
that just as much membership in a FTA increases trade flows for its members, increased
trade leads to endogenous determination to create a free trade agreement.
3.4.1 Estimation by Ordinary Least Squares
The logical place to start with an econometric estimation of gravity equation is by use
of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The OLS method has been traditionally the
usual technique for estimating the coefficients of the gravity model specification in its log
linear form, given as:
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lnXij = lnSi + lnMj + ln Φij + ln ij (3.4.1)
The OLS minimises the sum of squared random disturbances . Under certain assumptions
regarding the error term ij (such as normal distribution and uncorrelation with the
explanatory variables), OLS yields parameter values that are intuitively appealing and
have useful statistical properties. But the assumption of constant error variance across
observations (homoskedasticity) is a very strong one, and in the general case the error
terms perform on the contrary as heteroskedastic, leaving the regular OLS estimation
non-efficient. This is the most important reason as to why the OLS estimation of the
gravity equation has come under scrutiny. Additionally, when the gravity equation is
log-linearized there is loss of efficiency of the estimation due to the loss of information
that lead to biased estimates because of omission of data.
3.4.2 Fixed effects OLS estimation
The method most commonly used for controlling the multilateral resistance terms, and
which does not require assumption of symmetrical trade costs, is fixed effects estimation.
It assumes that the unobserved component in the regression is constant over time and by
creating dummies for every exporter and importer included in the estimation all country
specific effects are taken into account. These dummies are each equal to unity every time
a particular exporter or importer appears in the dataset. The coefficient of the dummies
for the importer and exporter should reflect the multilateral resistance of each country.
Before I rewrite the gravity equation in terms of fixed effects it seems appropriate to
augment the gravity equation given by Anderson and van Wincoop. It is commonly
accepted that the geographical distance may be a poor approximation of all the economic
barriers for international trade (Herrera & Baleix 2010). To control better for these
omitted variables the general gravity equation by Anderson and van Wincoop has been
completed by a range of variables depending on the focus of the relevant empirical paper.
It is common to include dummy variables for adjacency (a dummy that takes value 1 if
trade partners share a common border, 0 otherwise), common language (sharing language
should make all transaction easier and might have positive effect on bilateral trade),
colonial links (this can either mean to have a common coloniser or to have been colonised
by the other country in the past), regional trade agreement, RTA (1 if both countries are
members of a trade agreement, 0 otherwise), and many more. Grouping terms together
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for exporters and importers and taking logs, I rewrite the stochastic equation from (3.3.7)
as in Shepherd (2012):
lnXij = − lnYw+lnYi+lnYj +(1−σ) ln tij− (1−σ) lnPi− (1−σ) lnPj +ln ij (3.4.2)
The logarithmic specification of the equation allows an easy interpretation of the estimated
parameters: the parameters of an equation estimated in logarithms are elasticities. So
the estimated in logarithms parameter for GDP, for example, is the elasticity of trade to
GDP, indicating the percentage variation in trade following a 1 per cent increase in GDP.
By putting the terms together this log-linearized form can be rewritten as:
lnXij = C + Fi + Fj + (1− σ) ln tij (3.4.3)
where
C = − lnYw (3.4.4)
Fi = lnYi − lnPi (3.4.5)
Fj = lnYj − lnPj (3.4.6)
ln tij = b1 ln distanceij + b2adjacencyij + b3comlangij + b4colonyij (3.4.7)
The estimation of fixed effects model seems easy and straightforward. It provides a
convenient way to consistently estimate the theoretical gravity model: unobservable mul-
tilateral resistance is accounted for by dummy variables. However this way of estimating
also poses a major restriction on the model: variables that vary only in the same dimen-
sion as the fixed effects cannot be included in the model, because they would be perfectly
collinear with the fixed effects, and therefore needs to be dropped from the model. This
restriction means that it is not possible to include in the model data that vary only by
exporter (constant across all importer) or by importer (constant across all exporter). But
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unfortunately most of the policy data are exactly such that they vary only by exporter
or by importer. The country-pair fixed effect will then take out of the gravity equation
important variables such as land area, common language, common borders or distance,
and consequently, the effect of these variables on bilateral trade cannot be estimated.
One way of dealing with this problem is to take variables that vary by exporter or importer
and transform them artificially into a variable that varies bilaterally. Such variables
can then be included in the fixed effects model without any difficulty (Shepherd 2012).
Another weakness when using fixed effects estimation method with OLS is that zero-
observations in trade matrices are disregarded due to the fact that the natural logarithm
of zero is undefined.
The panel data provides an alternative to fixed effects estimation that still account for
unobserved heterogeneity, but allows the inclusion of variables that would be collinear
with the fixed effects (WTO and UNCTAD 2012). The problem of collinearity usually
arise from cross-section data, but is completely avoided with panel data. In this case
the exporter and importer fixed effects are time-varying. Another standard problem in
the cross-section empirical work is the potential endogeneity of right-hand-side variables.
If a RHS variable is correlated with the the error term, then it is considered economet-
rically endogenous and an OLS regression analysis may yield biased and inconsistent
coefficient estimates. Potential sources of endogeneity bias of RHS variables are gener-
ally omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error (Baier & Bergstrand 2007)
"Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase Members’ International Trade?". Accord-
ing to their research, countries are likely to select endogenously into FTAs, for reasons
probably unobservable for econometricians. This issue of endogeneity bias in estimat-
ing the effect of trade policies on trade volumes is addressed by Baier and Bergstrand
by use of instrumental-variables (IV), control-function (CF), and panel-data techniques.
The reason for why this is important to take into account is because if the FTAs are
endogenous, as it is argued for, then all the previous empirical estimates of the effects
of FTAs on trade flows may be biased and inconsistent, and the effect of FTAs on trade
may be seriously over - or under-estimated. When accounting econometrically for the
FTA variable´s endogeneity they find a ”striking” empirical result: the effect of FTAs on
trade flows quintuples. This shows that the panel data approach is the better estimation
method, only not with use of OLS. I review in later section that Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood estimation method is better at accounting for problems with zero-observations
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and heteroskedasticity (Silva & Tenreyro 2006).
3.4.3 Taylor approximation - an alternative to fixed effects estimation
To avoid the issue of unobservable multilateral resistance terms without using fixed effects
estimation, Baier & Bergstrand (2009) use a simpler approach to this estimation problem
by applying first-order Taylor approximation to the gravity equation, rewriting it such that
good old OLS can be used when estimating, instead of NLS. In addition, they argue that
without the structural system of nonlinear equations there is still not possible to generate
region - or pair-specific general equilibrium (GE) comparative statics. The criticism is
that fixed effects estimation precludes estimating multilateral resistance terms with and
without economic integration agreements (EIAs), but can not be used to construct a
system of nonlinear equations to estimate multilateral resistance terms with and without
the "border", meaning an estimation of country-specific border effects. They demonstrate
that using their first-order Taylor approximation technique and estimating the gravity
equation parameters with OLS they find almost identical parameters as in Anderson
and van Wincoop, but importantly enough allowing for asymmetric bilateral trade costs,
tij 6= tji, (which are assumed symmetric in Anderson and van Wincoop).
A first order Taylor-series expansion of any function f(xi) centred at x is given by f(xi) =
f(x) + f ′(x)(xi−x). Applied to the multilateral resistance terms in equations (3.3.8) and
(3.3.9) they derive following MR terms:
lnPi =
N∑
j=1
Yj
Yw
lnτij − 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Yi
Yw
Yj
Yw
lnτij (3.4.8)
lnPj =
N∑
i=1
Yi
Yw
lnτij − 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Yi
Yw
Yj
Yw
lnτij (3.4.9)
These two terms can be inserted into the log-linearized version of the gravity model in
equation (3.4.2) to get:
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lnXij = C+ lnYi+ lnYj+(1−σ)lnτij−(1−σ)
[
N∑
j=1
Yj
Yw
lnτij − 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Yi
Yw
Yj
Yw
lnτij
]
− (1 − σ)
[
N∑
i=1
Yi
Yw
lnτij − 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Yi
Yw
Yj
Yw
lnτij
]
+ lnεij
where C = −lnYw
or simplified by somewhat:
lnXij = C + lnYi + lnYj + (1− σ)lnτ ∗ij + lnεij (3.4.10)
where
lnτ ∗ij = lnτij −
N∑
i=1
Yi
Yw
lnτij −
N∑
j=1
Yj
Yw
lnτij +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Yi
Yw
Yj
Yw
lnτij (3.4.11)
Baier and Bergstrand apply their approach to McCallum’s US-Canada case and show
that they can generate same gravity equation coefficient estimates as those generated
using the technique in (Anderson & Wincoop 2003), but again instead of NLS using OLS
with exogenous multilateral resistance terms. They replace the unobservable theoretical
trade-cost variable τij with an observable variable by using bilateral distance (DISij)
and a dummy representing the presence or absence of an economic integration agreement
(EIAij). A dummy variable, BORDERij is such that EIAij ≡ 1−BORDERij, assuming
a value of 1 if regions i and j are not in the same nation. With data on trade flows, GDPs,
bilateral distances and borders in place they estimate the equation using OLS and confirm
by Monte Carlo simulations that their OLS method yields virtually identical estimates of
border and distance coefficients as those by Anderson and van Wincoop’s NLS method.
I will not apply first order Taylor approximation to my gravity equation in the later dis-
cussions, because I will use fixed effects to account for unobservable multilateral resistance
terms. Nonetheless I believe it is important to review this approach as it elegantly solves
the problem of unobservable terms and allows for a simple estimation of the equation.
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3.4.4 Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation (PPML)
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) present an intuitive and simple solution that fixes the problems
of zero observations and heteroskedasticity. The essential point is that ”the log lineari-
sation of the empirical model in the presence of heteroskedasticity leads to inconsistent
estimates because the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable depends on
higher-order moments of its distribution” (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, p. 653).
Recall the basic multiplicative gravity equation from (3.2.1):
Xij = GSiMjφijij (3.4.12)
where G is a gravity constant that varies over time in a panel data analysis, Si represents
all characteristics of the exporter country i, Mj represents all country characteristics of
j, φij represents geographical distance between exporter i and importer j, and ij is the
error term, the specification of which is crucial for choice of estimation of the gravity
model. When the error term is normally distributed there are certain assumptions that
needs to be fulfilled in order for the model to yield unbiased and consistent estimates.
Most important of these are the assumption of constant mean, E(ij) = µ and constant
variance, var(ij) = σ2. The assumption of constant variance implies that all observations
in the model come from probability density function with the same variance. Silva &
Tenreyro (2006) argue in their paper that when the gravity model is log-linearized the
log-linearized error term changes its properties and thus lead to inefficient estimations due
to heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity implies that the error term’s expected value is
no longer constant (or zero) and its variance is no longer a constant, but rather a function
is the regressors. The expectation of the error term in case of homoskedasticity are given
as: E(ij|Si,Mj, φij) = 1, i.e. the error term is independent of the regressors.
Log-linearizing the basic equation is as follows:
lnXij = lnG+ lnSi + lnMj + lnφij + ln ij (3.4.13)
Taking conditional expectation of this equation yields:
E(ln(Xij)|(Si,Mj, φij)) = E(ln(Xij)|lnG+ lnSi + lnMj + lnφij + lnij) (3.4.14)
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Applying the additive property of the expected value, obtain further:
E(ln(Xij)|(Si,Mj, φij)) = lnG+ lnSi+ lnMj + lnφij +E(ln(ij)|(Si,Mj, φij)) (3.4.15)
All of the coefficients, including the intercept, are estimated consistently if and only if
E(ln(φij)|(Si,Mj, ij)) = 0 holds. From before we know that E(ij|Si,Mj, φij) = 1, and
taking log of this yields ln(E(ij)|(Si,Mj, φij)) = 0. However, due to Jensen’s inequality
the result is such that:
ln(E(ij)|(Si,Mj, φij)) 6= E(ln(ij)|(Si,Mj, φij)) (3.4.16)
meaning that the logarithm of the expected value of a random variable is different from
the expected value of the logarithm. According to Jensen’s inequality the usual practice
of interpreting the parameters of any log-linearized models estimated by regular OLS
as elasticities can, in presence of heteroskedasticity, be highly misleading and potentially
bias. Applied to trade theory, Jensen’s inequality means that total predicted trade exceeds
total actual trade. In their research, Silva and Tenreyro found out that the log-linearized
OLS estimation of the gravity model greatly exaggerates the effects of GDP, geographical
proximity and of colonial ties on the bilateral trade flows. The presence of heteroskedas-
ticity can yield largely overestimated coefficients even controlling for fixed effects when
the gravity equation is log-linearized rather than being estimated in levels. As a result
of this the t-values for the estimated coefficients cannot be trusted. In addition, as I
mentioned previously, another problem with log-linearization is that it is incompatible
with the existence of zeros in trade data, which leads to elimination of zero-trade pairs.
Silva and Tenreyro propose, as a solution to these problems, to estimate the model in lev-
els, instead of taking logarithms. They suggest two alternative to OLS methods: nonlinear
least squares (NLS) and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), and conclude that
PPML is more preferred. By performing Monte Carlo simulations they show that their
method is robust to different patterns of heteroskedasticity, in addition to providing a nat-
ural way of dealing with zeros in trade data. The Poisson-PML estimator identifies the
coefficients using the same first-order conditions that are used by the maximum-likelihood
estimator derived from the Poisson distribution. Though Poisson-PML does not require
the dependent variable to be Poisson distributed.
The Poisson is consistent in presence of fixed effects and what is more beautiful is that
it naturally includes observations for which the observed trade vales are zero. Another
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thing that is good with PPML estimation is that it allows to interpret the coefficients
in the same pattern as under OLS estimation. Even though the dependent variable for
Poisson regression is defined as exports in levels and not in logarithms, the coefficients
of any independent variables entered in logs can still be interpret as simple elasticities.
The coefficient of the independent bilateral export variable entered the gravity equation
in levels will be interpret as semi-elastic, as under OLS.
3.4.5 Endogeneity of FTA
In their empirical paper on endogeneity of the preferential trade agreements (PTAs), Eg-
ger et al. (2011) use the non-linear multiplicative form of the gravity equation with country
fixed effects, and argue that the conditional error term of the equation is not unity and
hence the PTA variable is not exogenous, as many empirical researches in international
trade claim, but rather endogenous. By acknowledging the potential endogeneity of the
membership in a PTA, they allow for correlation between the error term ij and the
propensity to form an agreement. They tackle this problem by introducing an instrumen-
tal variable method that is based on the joint distribution of the error term ij and PTA.
The problem with endogeneity of PTA is that, as mentioned previously, there is a possible
reverse causality between a country pairs’ trade and their decision to become members
in a trade agreement. Until now it has been obvious that different trade agreements lead
to higher bilateral trade between member countries, but it is also so that the countries
that trade more from before are most likely to form or engage in a trade agreement. By
introducing an instrumental variable approach Egger et al. (2011) account for that issue.
In econometrics, endogeneity of an explanatory variable implies that the OLS assumption
of orthogonality (that the error term must be uncorrelated with each of the explanatory
variables) is violated and there is in fact a correlation between this endogenous variable
and the error term.
Egger et al. (2011) paper is unique because the authors unify the three important issues
in gravity equation estimation in one and try to account for all three in a unified frame-
work. By including importer and exporter fixed effects they account for the unobserved
multilateral resistance terms; the Poisson PML estimation is used in the two-stage estima-
tion of multiplicative gravity model so as to account for the zero trade flows; the reverse
causality, occurring because of endogenous PTA variable, is accounted for by introducing
instrumental variables. Estimation with instrumental variables is difficult because it is
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hard to prove the validity of the instruments used in the regressions.
With reference to my thesis, I believe the issue of reverse causality is highly possible due
to political and historical relationships between countries of Eurasian Economic Union.
Having been members of Soviet Union for many years, countries of Eurasian regional
integration share not only common borders, have a common Russian language (though
not official) that most of them speak, and cultural and historical ties that have been much
of the reasons as to why they have large trade flows prior to any Union. Hence introducing
instrumental variables would be very helpful in accounting for endogeneity of EIA in the
form of Eurasian regional integration in my thesis. But finding valid instruments is not
easy, because not only do they have to pass tests for validity, but they also have to be
significantly correlated with the probability of forming trade agreements, i.e. relevant.
This is a time consuming process and out of the scope of my thesis, but yet I wish to
stress the importance of endogeneity of free trade agreement variables and their causal
effect on the bilateral trade flows.
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4 Estimation
In this chapter I present and estimate my own gravity equation, building it on the theory
given in the previous chapter. Here I discuss the data, variables and the methodology of
the estimation and later investigate and interpret the results. The aim is to set up and
perform the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood panel data estimation and compare it
with the traditional panel data estimation technique based on the logarithmic transfor-
mation of the gravity equation. These proposed estimation techniques are applied on real
panel dataset of 45 countries over four years. I wish to base some parts of my approach
on Baier, Bergstrand, Egger & McLaughlin (2008) "Do Economic Integration Agreements
Actually Work? Issues in Understanding the Causes and Consequences of the Growth in
Regionalism", who look at what are the underlying causes of growth in regional integra-
tion agreements. They define economic integration agreements (EIAs) to be inclusive of
all free trade agreements (FTAs), customs unions, common markets and economic unions,
and for the purpose of my thesis I do the same - in this chapter I define a variable EIA that
is inclusive of all economic integrations agreements, and then I restrict it to integrations
agreements such as EU, Eurasian Economic Union, etc. The effects these dummy vari-
ables for economic integration agreements have on my dependent variable, the bilateral
exports, are the main focus of my estimations. I first describe the dataset and the sources
from which it is gathered, then I discuss the econometric specification and some of the
descriptive statistics of the data, and finally I present and discuss the results of my own
estimations.
4.1 Data Sources
The dataset combines data on bilateral trade relations for 45 countries over 4 years,
2010-2013. It is constructed for these four years because the Customs Union between
Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan came into force in 2010 and I use bilateral exports data
since then. The data is gathered from five separate sources and contains data on bilateral
exports, GDP, trade agreements, bilateral distance and a number of historical and cultural
relations. The purpose of this section is to explain how the different data sources have been
adapted and put together to make the final gravity dataset, and to discuss its strengths
and limitations.
I use data on nominal bilateral export flows in current US dollars from the International
Monetary Funds’ Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF DOTS) for 45 economies (see Ap-
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pendix C for a list of countries) over the years 2010-2013. I do this just as Baier et al.
(2008) do in their paper, when they define nominal bilateral trade flows for years 1960-
2000 for 96 potential trading partners. Bilateral export flows means all trade exports, in
total. Most of the data on bilateral trade export flows for 2010 is from United Nations’
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). The nominal bilateral exports
are then scaled by GDP deflator from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, with
base year that varies by country. I scale my data in the same way Baier et al. (2008)
do in their paper, and this is done so in order to generate real trade flows for the panel
analysis. I restrict my number of economies to 45 countries because these are the ones
of interest for my estimations - all EU countries, all countries that are in CISFTA, BRIC
countries (South Africa omitted) plus USA, New Zealand and Australia. CISFTA is a free
trade agreements between countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, such
as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan. These are natural countries to include when considering regional integration
between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, because these three countries trade extensively
with all the CIS countries and are also members of the CISFTA. The inclusion of the BRIC
is maybe not as natural. China is one of the most important trading partner for both
Russia and Kazakhstan, being the world’s largest importer of oil products, while India
and Brazil are not as important, but I believe being one of the largest emerging economies
they too should be included. The problem with the BRIC variable is that BRIC is not a
free trade agreement, it is only an association of five major emerging economies (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa), and so in my estimations the BRIC variable has
zero value, because there is no trade agreement within it. There exists extensive trade be-
tween these countries, but no free trade agreement. Years 2010-2013 covers period during
which The Eurasian Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has been
enacted (in 2010), with establishment of Single Economic Space between these countries
in 2012.
To measure country characteristics I use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured in
current US dollars. For this purpose I use data from World Bank´s World Development
Indicators for all 45 economies over the period of 4 years. These are also scaled by GDP
deflator for 2010-2013, to generate real GDP’s for the panel analysis.
The French CEPII institute (Centre d´Etudes Prospectives et d´Informations Interna-
tionales) has published a dataset containing many of the variables and dummies commonly
used in gravity estimations. GeoDist dataset provides several country-specific geographi-
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cal variables. The primary variable of interest for my purpose is the measure of bilateral
distances between countries. In addition there are bilateral dummies on whether or not
countries are contiguous (share common border), whether or not they have a common
official language, or if they have been in a colony or had a common coloniser, etc.
The most important variable of interest is the EIA dummy variable indicating whether
given pair of exporters and importers are partners in a trade agreement. The data is
constructed by De Sousa (2011) and is gathered from three different sources - Table 3
of Baier & Bergstrand (2007) "Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase Members’
International Trade?", the most recent WTO list of all RTAs in force and qualitative
information contained in Frankel (1997) "Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic
System". I divide the EIA dummy variable constructed from this into five different unions
- EU, CISFTA, EEU, BRIC and a variable called otherFTA, that contains information
on the trade agreements between China and New Zealand, Australia and New Zealand,
and Australia and USA. Notice here that BRIC does not have any trade agreement and
therefore has zero value in the regression analysis.
4.2 Econometric Specification
4.2.1 The model specification and variables
In general, the traditional estimates of gravity equation use data on country pairs that
trade in one direction, reporting either exports or imports. So instead of constructing
symmetric trade flows for each country pair by combining exports and imports I use a
unidirectional trade value in terms of exports and then introduce fixed effects for both
exporting countries and importing countries. This way the fixed effects represent a country
pair twice: first as exports from country i to country j, and then as exports from country
j to country i. There are then 45 x 44 = 198013 possible bilateral trading relationships,
and summing over 4 years there are 45 x 44 x 4 = 7920 observations.
With accordance to the theoretical gravity equation concept, I define bilateral exports
from country i to country j in year t, Xijt as a stochastic function of economic variables
representing GDP for country i in year t, Yit, GDP for country j in year t, Yjt, bilateral
resistance to trade represented by the distance between countries, Distijt, a number of
13N countries give N(N-1) bilateral country pairs, that is with 45 countries in my dataset this gives:
45*44 = 1980.
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proxies for trade costs (dummy variables), such as whether or not a pair of countries
share common official language (comlang − offijt), whether the two countries are con-
tiguous (contigijt), have ever had a colonial link (colonyij), have had a common coloniser
after 1945 (comcolij) or whether or not a pair of countries were/are the same country
(smctryij). These dummy variables are important for the purpose of my estimations,
because as I have stressed previously, the cultural and historical ties between post-Soviet
countries of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan are much of the reasons as to why an eco-
nomic regional integration between them is not a senseless affair. I have a policy variable
for regional trade agreements that I call EIAij, that I then further divide into 5 different
variables (dummies): EUij, BRICij, EEUij, CISFTAij and otherFTAij that contains
information on free trade agreements between China and New Zealand, Australia and New
Zealand and Australia and USA. BRICij variable is omitted from every regression in my
model, because the BRIC countries do not have a free trade agreement. Fixed effects are
represented by αit and αjt, the exporter and importer time varying, respectively. I also
include country-pair fixed effects αij that controls for the impact on trade of the different
characteristics such as distance between countries, common language, colonial status and
other observed and unobserved characteristics that are constant over time. And lastly,
there is the error term ijt. The stochastic multiplicative gravity model for international
trade is then given as:
Xijt = β0Y
β1
it Y
β2
jt Dist
β3
ijte
Uijtijt (4.2.1)
where Uijt is a vector of institutional, historical and policy factors:
Uij = β4comlangijt + β5contigijt + β6colonyijt + β8smctryijt + β9EUijt
+ β10EEUijt + β11CISFTAijt + β12BRICijt + β14otherFTAijt + αij + αit + αjt
The logarithmic transformation of the above given equation will yield this simple log-
linearized gravity equation:
lnXijt = lnβ0 + lnβ2Yit + lnβ3Yjt + Uijt + lnijt (4.2.2)
Remember that this way of specifying the equation allows for interpretation of the coef-
ficients as elasticities. I regress the model first as simple OLS, then as OLS with fixed
effects.
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4.2.2 PPML with fixed effects estimation
As discussed in section 3.4.4, the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation is
excellent in helping to avoid the heteroskedasticity and zero-observation bias. Thus I
modify my equation in (4.2.2) and rewrite it in PPML terms, with exports variable in
levels on LHS while keeping all other variables on the right hand side in log forms:
Xijt = lnβ0 + lnβ2Yit + lnβ3Yjt + Uijt + lnijt (4.2.3)
The vector of institutional and policy factors Uijt is the same as before. This way of
specifying the equation still allows for interpretation of the coefficients as in the usual
log-linearized OLS model, because the RHS variables remain in the log form.
So, summarised, I control for the multilateral resistance terms, emphasised by Anderson
and van Wincoop, by use of fixed effects estimation. This I can do because my variable of
interest, EIAijt (and the restricted version of it), varies between countries bilaterally. I
estimate the traditional log-linearized gravity equation with importer and exporter fixed
effects and country-and-time fixed effects in a panel data. Then, in order to eliminate
the potential heteroskedasticity in the error term and selection bias from using OLS
estimation (both with and without fixed effects) I use PPML estimator as suggested by
Silva & Tenreyro (2006).
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary for the main variables that are used in the estimations. This
description is useful as to see what values the variables have and to an extend how
much significance they have. For instance, the EIA dummy shows that out of 1980
bilateral trade relations 44% are fellow members of a trade agreement. When I restrict
the EIA dummy variable to yield specific trade agreements and unions I get more specific
percentage. For instance, only 0,6% out of 1980 bilateral relations are that of those
countries who are members of Eurasian Economic Union. European Union accounts for
almost 38% of bilateral relations, as the largest integration project among them. The
standard deviations imply that the effects of explanatory variables on trade flows vary,
sometimes substantially, as in the case of effect of distance on trade flows, or marginally,
as for regional trade agreement dummies.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Log of exporter GDP 25.357 2.397 20.352 30.305
Log of importer GDP 25.357 2.397 20.352 30.305
Common language 0.037 0.19 0 1
Contiguity 0.068 0.25 0 1
Colony 0.033 0.18 0 1
Common colonizer 0.082 0.274 0 1
Log of distance 7.863 1.024 4.088 9.883
Same country 0.02 0.139 0 1
European Union 0.379 0.485 0 1
CISFTA 0.056 0.229 0 1
BRIC 0 0 0 0
Eurasian Economic Union 0.006 0.078 0 1
Other FTAs 0.003 0.056 0 1
EIA dummy 0.441 0.497 0 1
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4.3.1 Correlation matrices
An initial and logical place to start with evaluating the model would be the correlation
matrix, to see whether or not the intuition behind the gravity model is consistent with
the regression at hand. Table 2 contains correlations between selected variables. Overall
the correlations given in the table are consistent with the general intuition. There is, as
expected, negative linear correlation between distance and bilateral exports - as distance
increases, bilateral trade decreases. Same is true for correlation between distance and
the EIA dummy - the larger is distance between given pair of countries, the less is the
possibility that they will form a regional trade agreement. On the contrary, there is
positive linear association between GDP’s and exports - bilateral trade increases when
both exporter and importer countries experience welfare gain in form of increased GDP.
The evidence of positive relationship between GDP of trading partners and bilateral
trade, and of negative relationship between distance and bilateral trade are consistent
with theory. But these correlations do not control for other potential influences and do
not equate to causation. They are also subject to considerable deviations, in particular at
low GDP and high distance. I do not draw any conclusions from this correlation matrix,
as a formal estimation is needed for such, but still it is useful to see the relationship
between the variables so as to get a general sense of the behaviour in the data.
Table 2: Correlation matrix on selected variables
Variables Log exports Log distance Log importer GDP Log exporter GDP EIA
Log exports 1.000
Log distance -0.252 1.000
Log importer GDP 0.466 0.107 1.000
Log exporter GDP 0.544 0.107 -0.023 1.000
EIA dummy 0.317 -0.638 0.031 0.030 1.000
4.4 Estimation Results
Table (3) presents empirical results of five different estimations of gravity equation (4.2.2).
These are estimated using panel data of real trade flows (Xijt), real GDPs for country i and
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country j, Yit and Yjt respectively, and a vector of historical and policy factors, in which the
EIA dummies are most important (EUijt, EEUijt, CISFTAijt, BRICijt, otherFTAijt).
There are also alternative specifications with and without bilateral fixed effects and time
dummies. The first column provides the baseline gravity equation estimated with OLS
without any fixed effects or time dummies for all four years. This is representation of
the "naive" log-linear model which drops all data points for which bilateral exports are
zero, does not account for multilateral resistance terms and also treats EIA dummies as
exogenous. Columns (2) is output of OLS estimation of gravity equation with importer
and exporter time fixed effects, while column (3) provides results of OLS estimation of
the equation with importer and exporter fixed effects, country pair and time dummies.
The estimations in columns (1)-(3) cannot be used to discuss the impact of economic
integration agreements on the dependent variable, and are only included for robustness
and general comparison with what has been discussed previously in the gravity model lit-
erature. Columns (4) and especially (5) contain my main regression results. As proposed
by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) I use the Poisson PML estimation method in order to account
for zero observations in my dataset and also to avoid the issue of heteroskedasticity of
the error term. In column (4) I ran the PPML estimation without any fixed effects, while
column (5) presents results of Poisson PML estimation with bilateral fixed and country-
and-time effects. In these methods of regressions I follow Shepherd (2012) who gives a
good overview of wide range of Stata commands for different regressions of the gravity
model.
In both results given in columns (4) and (5) the EIA variables are also treated exogenously.
As I briefly discussed in section (3.4.5) in order for the EIA dummies to be considered
endogenous I would have to use a two-stage Poisson PML estimation with instrumental
variables. As this is outside of the scope of my thesis I do not try to account for the issue
of endogeneity, but I wish to stress the importance of the issue and the significance it
would have on the final estimation results.
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Table 3: Regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent variables OLS Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects OLS PPML Fixed effects PPML
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Log of exports Exports
Log exporter GDP 1.171*** 0.278***
(0.018) (0.080)
Log importer GDP 1.031*** 0.667***
(0.014) (0.111)
Log distance -1.741*** -1.155*** -1.155*** -0.296*** -0.296***
(0.065) (0.145) (0.146) (0.099) (0.099)
Contiguity 0.266** 0.0639 0.0645 0.421*** 0.421***
(0.112) (0.392) (0.391) (0.111) (0.111)
Common language 0.178* 0.989 0.987 0.414** 0.416***
(0.0997) (0.921) (0.925) (0.161) (0.161)
Colony 0.968*** 0.929 0.931 0.205 0.201
(0.136) (0.590) (0.593) (0.127) (0.127)
Common colonizer 2.070*** 1.858*** 1.856*** 1.407*** 1.294***
(0.165) (0.0439) (0.0408) (0.368) (0.372)
Same country -1.756*** -1.357*** -1.357*** 0.483** 0.485**
(0.391) (0.353) (0.352) (0.196) (0.196)
EU 0.242*** 0.141 0.140 0.957*** 0.966***
(0.0733) (0.133) (0.134) (0.250) (0.248)
CISFTA 1.482*** 2.791*** 2.792*** 1.444*** 1.500***
(0.209) (0.0769) (0.0741) (0.419) (0.401)
EEU 0.514 0.799*** 0.829*** 1.406*** 1.499***
(0.335) (0.277) (0.274) (0.484) (0.429)
otherFTA 1.297*** 0.898*** 0.895*** -0.425 -0.426
(0.220) (0.263) (0.264) (0.258) (0.260)
Constant -38.89*** -81.69*** -53.73** -19.17*** -65.32***
(0.763) (18.00) (22.06) (3.354) (14.73)
Fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 7,915 7,915 7,915 7,919 7,919
R-squared 0.694 0.793 0.793 0.908 0.908
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.5 Discussion of the results
The Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, with removal of internal
customs posts and implementation of common external imports tariff, came into force in
2010. Since then trade among these countries has grown significantly. For example, trade
exports between Russia and Kazakhstan in 2011 increased almost twice in comparison to
2010, while exports from Kazakhstan to Russia doubled from 2010 to 2011, and continued
to increase since then. Same goes for exports from Russia to both Kazakhstan and Belarus.
Belarus and Kazakhstan trade little with each other, but even their turnover increased
largely since Customs Union began its operations. This is obvious from looking at the
coefficient of interest, EEU, which large in magnitude and highly significant. Exports
will, on average, be about 83% higher if exporting to a fellow member of Eurasian trade
agreement when gravity equation is estimated with fixed effects OLS, and a whole 150%
higher once estimated with fixed effects PPML. The coefficient value for EU is also large
and significant with PPML estimation, meaning that being a member of EU increases
member country’s international trade with about 96%. Both EU and EEU coefficients
yield very large values when estimated with PPML method, and there might be several
reasons for this, that I wish to shortly speculate over.
Baier & Bergstrand (2007) and Baier et al. (2008) discuss fixed effects estimations of
the theoretically motivated gravity equation with so-called "phased-in" trade agreements,
meaning that economic integration agreements do not yield consistent results right away,
and are rather phased in over time, typically five to ten years. Thus, they argue, it is
reasonable to include lagged levels of the EIA dummies. Results in both papers show
statistically significant lagged effects on trade flows. For instance, Baier et al. (2008)
coefficient estimate for EU yields result that membership in EU increases trade by 100%
(Baier et al. (2008) p.487), while membership in any other EIA increases trade by almost
60%. Thus, if I were to include lagged effects for both EU and EEU variables, their esti-
mates would probably not be as large as they are now without any lagged values, and the
coefficient estimates would yield plausible values, balanced across periods. This explains
to an extend large coefficient estimates in current period for EU and EEU. Another reason
as to why the coefficients for EU and EEU dummies are high and significant, is because
PPML estimation corrects for zero trade, thus including bilateral export relations even
if they are very very small in values. Intra-European trade is to be expected to enhance
because of geographical proximity (short distance between countries), cultural ties and
even common language in some cases, something that empirical findings in my gravity
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estimation and many other research papers support. Also, the significantly large effect of
CISFTA on bilateral exports is explained by the fact that the countries of Commonwealth
of Independent States are either landlocked, have had common coloniser or been same
country before, and hence have tendency to trade largely with each other. In column
(5) the positive and significant coefficient for CISFTA suggest that on average the CIS
countries trade 150% more once in a free trade agreement. The home bias effect, first
introduced by McCallum (1995) can also give some explanation for these rather high trade
flows, both between CIS countries and countries of EEU.
When Silva & Tenreyro (2006) first introduced estimations by Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood as opposed to OLS estimations, they performed a number of Monte Carlo
simulations comparing the estimates from PPML approach with those of OLS, and found
that in presence of heteroskedasticity estimates obtained using log-linearized models are
highly biased, thus distorting interpretation of the model. This way they show that
the OLS estimates, whether significant or not, can not yield unbiased estimates once
heteroskedasticity is present. Further, Silva & Tenreyro (2006) show that OLS greatly
exaggerates the roles of colonial ties and geographical proximity. This is also true seen
with respect to my own estimations, when PPML estimate for distance decreases to a
value of 0.296 in absolute terms, from an initial OLS value of 1.741 - as geographical
distance between a pair of countries increases, their bilateral trade decreases by about
30%. This means that, after controlling for bilateral distance, sharing a border does not
influence trade as much as it is given by OLS estimates. This largely reflects the impact
of heteroskedasticity on the original OLS estimates, for which Poisson gravity regression
controls for. Notice that when estimated by PPML method, the coefficients for importer
and exporter GDP’s are also smaller than those in OLS estimation, showing, as it has been
discussed by several trade researchers, that the effect of GDP on bilateral trade does not
necessarily equal to unity, as it was assumed previously. Interestingly, Poisson estimates
indicate that colonial ties do not play a substantial role for whether or not countries trade
extensively, as was also pointed out by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) - coefficient values for
variable colony does not have any significance in PPML estimation. But the variable for
whether or not a pair of countries have had a common coloniser show a significant and
positive effect, which is seen with respect to past colonial ties of post-Soviet countries.
The high level of intra-bloc trade between countries of Eurasian regional integration might
not be due to the formation of the preferential trade and customs agreement, but to
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geopolitical and historical relationship between them, as I have been trying to point out
throughout this chapter by looking at significance of the historical and cultural ties be-
tween post-Soviet countries. For this reason the establishment of a trade agreement and
further integration into an economic unity cannot be considered as an a purely exogenous
decision, independent of these relationships, hence the endogeneity of PTAs, as consid-
ered by Egger et al. (2011). The authors take into account this problem of endogeneity
(yielding reverse causality) and also that bilateral trade flows contain numerous zero en-
tities, omission of which can give insufficient results and potential bias. They introduce
instrumental variables, that account for the endogeneity of preferential trade agreement
and run PPML estimation with both exogenous and endogenous PTA dummy. The in-
struments they introduce have an effect on the probability to form a PTA, but they do
not have any other, direct effects on exports (as they argue and test for). Their results
suggest that the impact of endogenous PTAs on members’ relative to non-members’ trade
flows is 188 percentage points higher than in a model which assumes PTA membership to
be exogenous. This result leads them to conclude that failure to regard the PTAs as en-
dogenous biases the coefficient estimates downward. Unfortunately, I cannot say in which
way instrumental variables for trade agreements in my estimation would lead coefficient
estimates, without having applied the instrumental variable approach to my estimation
method.
All in all, there can be many reasons for the rather drastic increase in trade flows between
EEU member countries and it is important to understand whether this is due to emergence
of Customs Union and subsequent liberalization of trade within the Union, which is the
trade creation effect, or if it is because of redirection of existing trade flows from third
part countries (outside of the Union) towards CU countries - that is trade diversion. The
analysis has in general shown that the integration is an important factor that increased
the level of mutual trade between member countries of Eurasian Economic Union in period
of 2010-2013. However, one must be cautious with interpretation of this high and positive
effect, as it can be explained by many other underlying factors. One possible explanation
could be that the trade increased as a natural recovery after the financial crisis of 2008-
2009, that would have happened even in absence of a Customs Union being formed.
Another explanation for this could be one by Libman & Vinokurov (2010), the holding
together regionalism effect. It is a view that the post-Soviet countries tend to trade more
with each other because they have recently belonged to a single political entity and have
intensive infrastructure, economic and social ties between each other.
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5 Conclusion
The gravity equation is considered as one of the most successful empirical models in
economics and has been devoted an extensive attention by researchers ever since Tinbergen
(1962). In this master thesis I discuss how the gravity model can be used to account for
different economic integration agreements (EIAs), cultural and historical ties and what
are the effects of these on international trade flows (exports). My main focus has been
on newly established Eurasian Economic Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus
and its effect on export flows of member countries. To see this I have run my own gravity
regression using a specified dataset to further supplement the discussion.
In this thesis, I have reviewed the theory of gravity model, both its theoretical and econo-
metrical methodology. I have limited my discussions to what is relevant for my own
estimations and hence have not given excessive and complete examination of the model
as it is rather large and complex. Taking into account introduction of multilateral resis-
tance terms by Anderson & Wincoop (2003) I control for these by adding fixed effects
to my own gravity estimation, and then further account for heteroskedasticity in error
terms and omission of zero trade values by estimating the equation with Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood approach introduced by Silva & Tenreyro (2006). My estimations
show that membership in the Eurasian Economic Union increases members’ trade flows
by approximate 150%. This high value is supported by my combined dataset on export
flows between countries during years 2010-2013.
The Customs Union between these three post-Soviet countries, only few years in place, has
already attracted the attention of researchers. Many analysts tend to portray the Union
as largely a geopolitical project, which it most likely is. However, there lies disagreement
about its future impact: some view it as a start of further regional integration on the
post-Soviet space, and ultimately an instrument for larger economic development, while
others fear that the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus will lead
to more protectionism and perpetuate an inefficient economic structure inherited from
the Soviet times. It has not been my intend to give a clear answer to the question of
whether or not the Eurasian regional integration will become a driving force for large
integration in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and whether or not it will lead
to more protectionism. I believe that a general assessment of the impact of Customs
Union will neither unambiguously be positive or negative - there are winners and there
are losers and it is necessary to account for in depth details and nuances. With help of
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gravity model estimations I show that there is in fact a positive and significant increase
in bilateral exports due to EEU, but I am cautions in my interpretation of these results.
The large effect of EEU on intra-regional trade might be due to the existence of home bias
effect, that is arguably existent in the region that inherent similar economic structures
and where countries are located closer to each other than to the rest of the world. It
might also be because of holding together effect, that is due to the fact that countries have
only 24 years ago belonged to a single political entity, or it might be as a post-financial
crisis natural recovery effect. My conclusions are presented modestly, with attention to
robustness and issues of uncertainty.
The gravity model is thought of as a workhorse when it comes to describing the behaviour
or trade flows, but cannot be considered to perform well when it comes to describing an
economic welfare as such, and I have not addressed any welfare implications of EIAs.
Because of data limitations it is often difficult to assess the welfare effects of regional
trade agreements and hence the gravity model estimation of such agreements can be seen
as a first step in seeing the effects EIA’s have on trade flows. Other methods should be used
for applications on economic welfare, for instance such as computable general equilibrium
(CGE) modelling. CGE models are an effective analytical tool enabling complex ex-ante
modelling of the consequences of exogenous policy changes. This type of modelling is
also very good when looking at the effects of capital and labor flows across sectors or
countries as a result of trade liberalisation, something that the gravity model cannot give
any estimation of. But the gravity’s comparative advantage is in its ability to use data
in order to assess the sensitivity of trade flows to particular trade costs factors, such as
different policies. This is why I choose to use gravity model in my thesis, as to see what
the effect of a trade liberalising policy between countries in Eurasian Economic Union will
be on the international trade flows of these countries.
Eurasian Economic Union is not the first economic or customs union that has been an-
nounced on the post Soviet space, nor is it the first time high level political meetings
have made bold pronouncements about vital importance of Eurasian economic integra-
tion. Even though estimation in this thesis has yielded a positive outcome of EEU on
the member countries trade relations, these results are still short-lived and it remains
to see how this project will prove itself in the long-run and what kind of welfare effects
it will have. And a fair amount of scepticism is to be retained about the future of the
Eurasian integration. Much of the progress so far has been without a doubt dependent
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on the personalities of the leaders in the three countries, thus making the union very
vulnerable to any political changes in the leadership. It is yet too soon to see to what ex-
tend the multiple benefits the Eurasian regional integration may materialise, and whether
or not numerous challenges can be overcome or at least minimised. Nevertheless, it is
still possible to see to some extend what can be learned from the early evidence. This
economic integration brings about unique opportunity to build stronger economic and
political institutions, but only if certain conditions are fulfilled, which remains to see.
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A Derivation of Anderson and van Wincoop CES de-
mand function
In the following derivation I use those provided by Theie (2014) in his master thesis "Non-
tariff barriers, trade integration and the gravity model" at the Department of Economics,
University of Oslo.
Maximazation of CES utility function in equation (6) with respect to budget constraint
in (7) gives the following Lagrangian:
L =
[
N∑
i=1
β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
] σ
σ−1
− λ
[
N∑
i=1
τijpicij − Yj
]
(A.0.1)
First order derivation with respect to cij:
∂L
∂cij
≡
[
N∑
i=1
β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
] 1−σ
σ
β
1−σ
σ
i c
−1
σ
ij − λτijpi = 0 (A.0.2)
Multiplying both sides by cij yields:
λτijpicij =
[
N∑
i=1
β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
] 1−σ
σ
β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij (A.0.3)
Summing over all i′s:
λ
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where
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i=1 τijpicij = Yj
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Insert for λ from (39) and then rearrange such that:
τijpi =
β
1−σ
σ
i c
−1
σ
ij Yj∑N
i=1 β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
(A.0.6)
Raise both sides by −σ and multiply by τijpi:
(τijpi)
−στijpi =
 β 1−σσi c−1σij Yj∑N
i=1 β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
−σ τijpi (A.0.7)
Rearrange:
(τijpiβi)
1−σ =
Y −σj cijτijpi[∑N
i=1 β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij
]−σ (A.0.8)
Then sum over all i′s such that:
N∑
i=1
(τijpiβi)
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Y −σj
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where
∑N
i=1 τijpicij = Yj, so that:
N∑
i=1
(τijpiβi)
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σ
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σ−1
σ
ij
(A.0.10)
Define
[∑N
i=1(τijpiβi)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
= Pj as a price index of country j and rewrite the equation
such that:
N∑
i=1
β
1−σ
σ
i c
σ−1
σ
ij =
Y 1−σj
P 1−σj
(A.0.11)
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Innsert this back into equation (44):
(τijpiβi)
1−σ =
cijτijpi
Yj
P 1−σj (A.0.12)
Remember that the nominal value of exports from country i to country j in chapter 3 is
given by Xij = τijpicij. Innserting (48) into this expression yields the demand for goods
from country i by country j consumers:
Xij =
(τijpiβi)
1−σ
P 1−σj
Yj (A.0.13)
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B Abbreviations
BRIC Brasil Russia India China
CET Common External Tariff
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CISFTA Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agreement
CU Customs Union
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EFTA European Free Trade Agreement
EIA Economic Integration Agreement
EU European Union
EurAsEC Eurasian Economic Community
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Growth Domestic Product
IMF DOTS International Monetary Fund Directions of Trade Statistics
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
RTA Regional Trade Agreement
SES Single Economic Space
UN COMTRADE United Nations International Trade Statistics Database
WTO World Trade Organization
USSR The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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C List of countries in the dataset
Armenia Czech Republic Kazakhstan Romania
Australia Denmark Kyrgyzstan Russia
Austria Estonia Latvia Slovakia
Azerbaijan Finland Lithuania Slovenia
Belarus France Luxembourg Spain
Belgium Germany Malta Sweden
Bulgaria Greece Moldova Tajikistan
Brasil Hungary Netherlands Turkmenistan
China India New Zealand Ukraine
Croatia Ireland Poland United Kingdom
Cyprus Italy Portugal United States
Uzbekistan
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